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I. INTRODUCTION

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
On June 15, 2006, the United States Supreme Court decided Hudson v.
Michigan,2 holding that "the exclusionary rule is inapplicable" to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the execution of a search warrant where the officers
executing the warrant fail to knock and announce their presence before entering
t
State v. Savage, 906 A.2d 1054, 1088 (Md. 2006) (discussing Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.
Ct. 2159 (2006)).
1
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
2
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the dwelling: the khock-and-announce rule.3 Within hours, Supreme Court
watchers, reading "between the lines," 4 questioned whether the exclusionary
rule, suppressing evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, would
continue as a remedy for violations of the Search and Seizure Clause.5 Scholars
describe Hudson as "eviscerat[ing] an essential remedy ' 6 for Fourth Amendment violations and as a "rather ominous decision ' 7 confirming that the United
States Supreme Court is on a "path of assaulting privacy and civil liberties .... 8
The holding in Hudson v. Michigan can be characterized as a very narrow one, 9 so why has Hudson created so much concern? Does Hudson v.
Michigan mark a drastic shift in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,' 0 or is Hudson just another step in a long series of Supreme Court

3

126 S. Ct. at 2165.
Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Exclusionary Rule in Trouble, Supreme Court of the United
States
Blog
(June
15,
2006),
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives
/2006/06/analysis exclus.html (last visited on Feb. 24, 2007).
5
See, e.g., id.; Jennifer Yackley, Note, Hudson v. Michigan: Has the Court Turned the Exclusionary Rule into the ExclusionaryException?, 30 HAMLINE L. REv. 409 (2007).
6
Mitchell E. Kempker, Note, The Knock-and-Announce Rule: An Illusory Hurdle or a Legitimate Law Enforcement Limitation?, 71 Mo. L. REv. 787, 787 (2006) ("On June 15, 2006, the
United States Supreme Court eviscerated an essential remedy for violation of [the knock-andannounce] rule .... ); David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things:
The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 283, 304 (2006)
("The Death of an Ancient Privacy Protection").
7
Gerald G. Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge Between the War on Drugs and
the War on Terrorism, 67 U. Prrr. L. REv. 753, 777 (2006) (discussing Supreme Court cases regarding the Fourth Amendment in the context of drug and terrorism prosecutions).
Id. For similar reactions to Hudson, see, e.g., Moran, supra note 6, at 283 (stating, albeit
8
4

somewhat facetiously, that "Hudson v. Michigan signals the end of the Fourth Amendment as we
know it" (footnotes omitted)); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and the Police, 753
PLI/Lrr 17, 19 (August 2006) ("Justice Scalia's opinion left no doubt that there are four Justices
on the current Court ready and willing to completely eliminate the exclusionary rule as a remedy
for police violations of the Fourth Amendment."); and Ashdown, supra note 7, at 778 (characterizing the majority's analysis as having "portentous consequences").
9
See, e.g., United States v. Southerland, 466 F.3d 1083, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("[T]he exclusionary rule [does] not apply to Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce violations .... ); United
States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 259 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006) (Where "the illegality is restricted to a
violation of the knock-and-announce rule .... no one, not even the owner, can suppress [the evidence]."); Denniston, supra note 4 ("The bare holding of the case is simple: if police have a warrant to search a home, and they enter in a way that violates their constitutional duty to knock first
and announce themselves, the evidence turned up in the search can be used in a criminal prosecution.").
10 John D. Castiglione, Hudson and Samson: The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy, Dignity,
and the Fourth Amendment, 68 LA. L. REv. 63, 66 (2007) ("Hudson was the first shot across the
bow in what promises to be a long campaign by the 'conservative' bloc of the Court to undermine,
and ultimately overrule, the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.").
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decisions narrowing the protections of the Fourth Amendment? l Are commentators responding to the Supreme Court's 4-1 record of ruling for the police
when deciding Fourth Amendment questions in the new Chief Justice's first
term, 12 or are they reacting to Justice Scalia's broad-sweeping language in the
opinion? 3 Or are commentators and scholars uncomfortable reconsidering asthe exclusionary rule is based, assumptions that Hudson
sumptions upon which
14
calls into question?
Hudson's critical impact on the exclusionary rule is that it reopens the
debate over the necessity of the exclusionary rule, a debate that should be focused on present day circumstances. Hudson v. Michigan, at its core, does not
mark a drastic change in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply, the Supreme
Court weighed the rule's deterrence benefits against its social costs.' 5 Courts
and commentators alike have expressed discomfort with the balancing of costs
See Ashdown, supra note 7, at 757-79 (surveying Supreme Court cases "to illustrate the
threat to civil liberties" found in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the last thirty
years); Castiglione, supra note 10, at 82 ("Carving exceptions out of the exclusionary rule has
been something of a pet project for the Court since the rule was incorporated to the states in Mapp
v. Ohio.").
12
See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 19 (discussing the Supreme Court's record in Fourth
Amendment cases in Chief Justice John Roberts' first term); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive
Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J.
483, 527 n.132 (2006) ("The state prevailed in four out of the five Fourth Amendment cases decided just this last term .. ").The Court ruled for law enforcement in Hudson v. Michigan, 126
S. Ct. 2159 (2006); United States v. Grubbs, 126 S.Ct. 1494 (2006); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,
126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006); and Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006). Only in Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) did the defendant prevail in a Fourth Amendment case in Chief
Justice Roberts's first term.
13 See Denniston, supra note 4. He states that
ll

[Hudson v. Michigan] suggests.., new doubt about the continuing validity of
the 'knock-and-announce' rule. Those implications seem to emerge in some
of the language used, and certainly between the lines, of the ruling ....
The Scalia opinion... relies on two fundamental theories, both of which
pose questions about how far the decision may ultimately reach, or what future changes in constitutional doctrine it may portend.
Id.; see also Moran, supra note 6, at 307 ("It was ... the evident hostility to the exclusionary rule
permeating Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court that attracted the most attention to the decision
in Hudson.").
14
See Chris Blair, Hudson v. Michigan: The Supreme Court Knocks and Announces the Demise of the Exclusionary Rule, 42 TULSA L. REV.751, 756-59 (2007); Castiglione, supra note 10,
at 65 ("[T]he continued vitality of one of the most well-established tenants of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence-the exclusionary rule-was back in play almost a century after it was established.").
15
See Ashdown, supra note 7, at 778 (characterizing the Hudson opinion as "applying the now
familiar analysis of balancing the advantages of applying the exclusionary rule to a particular
constitutional violation against its social costs" (emphasis added)); see also infra Part II.C.
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and benefits.' 6 They have gone so far as suggesting that the critical questions
about the necessity of the exclusionary rule have been answered and do not need
to be reexamined. 17 Hudson has effectively reopened a long-standing debate
regarding the benefits of the exclusionary rule: do adequate alternative remedies exist that diminish the need for the exclusionary rule?
A survey of lower-court decisions applying Hudson reveals that courts
are uncomfortable with Hudson's proposition that civil suits and police training
diminish the need for the exclusionary rule. 18 However, the same courts rely on
Hudson's examination of the social costs of suppression to diminish the scope
of the exclusionary rule. 19 This mixture of the extension of Hudson with the
discomfort regarding Hudson's proposed alternative remedies shows that the
long-term effect of Hudson is not as clear as many have suggested. The debate,
however, has been reopened, and initially it appears that the exclusionary rule
will continue to narrow unless courts affirmatively and explicitly find that Hudson's alternative remedies are not adequate.
In exploring these propositions, Part II will consider the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, focusing on the development of the costsbenefits balancing test that the United States Supreme Court has applied to determine whether suppression of evidence is appropriate in various contexts. In
order to better understand Hudson, Part Ill will review a brief history of the
knock-and-announce rule. Against that backdrop, Part IV will review the opinions in the case of Hudson v. Michigan, with particular emphasis on Justice
Scalia's application of the costs-benefits balancing test and related portions of
the dissenting opinion. Part V will briefly consider the impact of Hudson on the
knock-and-announce rule. 20 Finally, Part VI examines Hudson's impact on the
future of the exclusionary rule, proposing that Hudson has reopened the debate
16

See, e.g., Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority's 'substantial

social costs' argument is an argument against the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary principle
itself."); Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 20 ("This argument has no stopping point; if followed, it
would call for total elimination of the exclusionary rule."); Fourth Amendment-Exclusionary
Rule-"Knock-and-Announce" Violations, 120 HARV. L. REv. 173, 174 (2006) [hereinafter
Fourth Amendment-Exclusionary Rule] ("Because the majority's assertion that the costs of exclusion outweigh the benefits in this context is applicable to the exclusionary rule more broadly,
the Court may rely on Hudson in the future to eliminate the rule altogether."); see also WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 1 Search & Seizure § 1.6
(4th ed. 2007) (stating that Hudson's cost-benefits holding "is especially unfortunate, for it is open
to broader application to other varieties of Fourth Amendment violations"); Denniston, supra note
4 ("Those forms of deterrent, of course, would not necessarily be at play only regarding the
knock-and-announce rule. In a future case, involving a different right, they could be found to be
equally persuasive alternatives to the exclusionary rule.").
17
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 931 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18

See infra Part VI.B.

19

See infra Part VI.D.

20

Several other scholars have recently published articles discussing Hudson's impact on the

knock-and-announce rule. See infra note 237. As such, this Note will briefly make several pertinent observations on this point.
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on the necessity of the exclusionary rule and that the exclusionary rule will not
survive this debate. In examining these propositions, Part VI will also survey
lower-court reactions to Hudson as they relate to the future of the exclusionary
rule and the debate over alternative remedies.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE, IN BRIEF

The exclusionary rule, "mak[ing] evidence inadmissible in court if law
enforcement officers obtained it by means forbidden by the Constitution, by
statute or by court rules[,] '' 21 exists in the context of several Constitutional provisions.2 2 Relevant to the discussion of Hudson v. Michigan is the constitutional
basis of the exclusionary rule in the context of the Fourth Amendment, as set
forth in Mapp v. Ohio,23 and the purpose 24 of the exclusionary rule in the
Court's modem precedent.25
Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REv.
665, 665 (1970).
22
Id. at 665. Specifically, Oaks separates the exclusionary rule into "four major types of
21

violations[,]" including
searches and seizures that violate the fourth amendment, confessions obtained
in violation of the fifth and sixth amendments, identification testimony obtained in violation of these amendments, and evidence obtained by methods so
shocking that its use would violate the due process clause.
Id. For a listing of exemplar cases in each area, see id. at 665 n. 1.
23
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24
The Supreme Court has not been clear in distinguishing between the constitutional basis of
the exclusionary rule and its corresponding purpose. For example, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976), Justice Powell referred to the rule's "deterrent purpose," but also stated that "[t]he
primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence." Id. at 486 (emphasis
added). Then-retired Justice Stewart recognized the importance of distinguishing between the
basis of the rule and its purpose when he examined three possible bases for the rule. Stewart,
infra note 26, at 1380-89; see also Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a
"PrincipledBasis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (198283) [hereinafter PrincipledBasis]. The importance of the distinction between basis and purpose
becomes apparent upon examining the effect that the basis for the rule has on its scope and its
long-term validity. Part of the reasoning in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 465, examining one possible basis for the exclusionary rule, exemplifies the relationship between basis and purpose.
There, the Court rejected the "imperative of judicial integrity" as the basis for the exclusionary
rule. Id. at 485 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted). Justice Powell rejected this basis for the
exclusionary rule because it did not explain the scope or purpose of the rule: "Logically extended
[the imperative of judicial integrity] justification would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, or even over his assent." Id.
While Justice Powell worked backwards from the scope of the rule to understand the "limited
role" of the imperative of judicial integrity as a basis for the rule, his logic nonetheless shows the
importance of the distinction: the basis underpinning the rule defines the purpose of the rule. Id.
But see Castiglione, supra note 10, at 98-100 (asserting that the judicial integrity should continue
to require suppression).
25
As Professor Yale Kamisar notes, "There is a vast literature on this subject." Yale Kamisar,
In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARv. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 119, 119 n.1
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Application of the Exclusionary Rule to the States

As stated by then-retired Justice Potter Stewart, "the fourth amendment
itself says nothing about the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence., 26 Furthermore, early exclusionary rule cases did not discuss whether the rule should
exist, nor did they focus on basis for the rule.27 The cases about which Justice
Stewart spoke, Boyd v. United States, 28 Adams v. New York, 29 and Weeks v.
United States,3 ° preceded the Court's decision to apply the exclusionary rule to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment by as much as seventy-five
years. 31 In those cases, suppression of evidence was based on the "fifth amendment's ban on compulsory testimony" 32 and "the fourth amendment's mandate
that the government return wrongfully seized property. 3 3 However, by Mapp v.
Ohio, the Court's view of the exclusionary rule had "significantly broadened. 3 4
(2003) (containing a selective bibliography of articles providing "a good sampling" in the search
and seizure exclusionary rule area).
26
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1372
(1983); accord United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) ("The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands ..
"). But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 932 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A]s
critics of the exclusionary rule never tire of repeating, the Fourth Amendment makes no express
provision for the exclusion of evidence secured in violation of its commands. A short answer to
this claim, of course, is that many of the Constitution's most vital imperatives are stated in general
terms and the task of giving meaning to these precepts is therefore left to subsequent judicial
decisionmaking in the context of concrete cases." (footnotes omitted)); Yale Kamisar, Principled
Basis, supra note 24, at 581-89 ("The Constitution Says Nothing About An Exclusionary RuleBut It Has Nothing to Say About a Great Many Things.").
27
Stewart, supra note 26, at 1372 (1983). Justice Stewart discusses "three cases [through
which] the rule was established," specifically, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Adams
v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For another
view of the early development of the exclusionary rule and its related justifications, see Jerry E.
Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 261, 263-70 (1998). For a well-reasoned critical view of the justifications of the exclusionary rule, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757
(1994).

28
29

30

116 U.S. 616 (1886).
192 U.S. 585 (1904).
232 U.S. 383 (1914).

31

See cases cited supra notes 28-30; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to states); see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to states).
32
Stewart, supra note 26, at 1375; see also id. at 1373 (stating that, in Boyd, exclusion was
"injected ...

into the picture by ...

the 'intimate relation' between the fourth and fifth amend-

ments" (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633).
33

Stewart, supra note 26, at 1375.

34

Id. at 1375 (noting developments in the cases of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920) and Gouledv. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)).
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Over a decade before Mapp, in Wolf v. Colorado35 the Court held that
the protections of the Fourth Amendment were incorporated against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.36 In other words, the
protections from unreasonable searches and seizures would not apply only to
federal actions but also to state actions.37 Having held the rights of the Fourth
Amendment applicable against the states, the Court nonetheless held that the
exclusionary rule, as a remedy, was not applicable to the states:
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an
effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for
this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards
assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other
methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective. 38
In a later opinion, the Court "indicated that such should not be done until the
rule.' 39
States had 'adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the [exclusionary]
Essentially, states had an opportunity to establish adequate alternative remedies
to ensure that the protections of the search and seizure clause were not an
-empty promise.' 4 °
Twelve years later in Mapp v. Ohio, however, the Court essentially rejected the existence of adequate alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule,
referring to "[t]he obvious futility" of securing the Fourth Amendment protections through "other remedies. '41 Justice Frankfurter eloquently stated:
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the
same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the [exclusionary] rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches
and seizures would be 'a form of words', valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
35
36

338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 31 (emphasis added).

39
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134
(1954)).
40
Id. at 660.
41

Id. at 652.
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from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Without suppression, the Constitution would "grant the right but in reality...
withhold its privilege and enjoyment. 4 3 On this reasoning, 44 the exclusionary
rule was held to be "an essential part of the right to privacy," a "new constitutional right," and the Fourth Amendment's "most important constitutional privilege."45
The Court in Mapp relied on at least two rationales for the exclusionary
rule: deterrence 46 and "the imperative of judicial integrity. '' 7 The exclusionary
rule would ensure enjoyment of the rights noted above through deterrence:
"compel[ling] respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."'48 With regard to the
imperative of judicial integrity, the court would not condone illegal activity by
using the fruits of those activities at trial.4 9 Based on these two rationales,5 °
42

Id. at 655 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).

43

Id. at 656.

Notably, this reasoning did not command a majority of the Court in Mapp. Justice Black,
who constituted the fifth vote for the majority, was "not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment,
standing alone, would be enough" to require exclusion of evidence. Id. at 661 (Black, J., concurring). He looked to the "close interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments" to
find a "basis ...which not only justifies but actually requires the exclusionary rule." Id. at 662
(Black, J., concurring); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484-85 n.21 (1976) ("Only four
Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in state criminal trials. Mr. Justice Black adhered to his view that the
Fourth Amendment, standing alone, was not sufficient, but concluded that, when the Fourth
Amendment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban against compelled selfincrimination, a constitutional basis emerges for requiring exclusion." (internal citations omitted)).
This reasoning hearkens back to the reasoning employed in Boyd v. UnitedStates. See supra note
32 and accompanying text.
45
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
46
Id. at 656.
47
Id. at 659.
48
Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)) (emphasis added).
49
Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222).
50
The actual reasons upon which Mapp was based are a subject that is debated as widely as
any other aspect of the exclusionary rule. Justice Brennan, dissenting in United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974), asserted that Mapp was based on deterrence and judicial integrity, calling them "the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in
official lawlessness and of assuring the people-all potential victims of unlawful government
conduct-that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk
of seriously undermining popular trust in government." In contrast, Professor Norton asserts that
Justice Clark's majority opinion in Mapp stated at least five justifications. Norton, supra note 27,
at 262-65. The first was found in the interrelationship of the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at
264. Professor Norton finds this justification in the fact that the majority cites to Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Norton, supra note 27, at 264. It is worth noting, however, that the
44
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Justice Frankfurter held in expansive terms: "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same
' 51
authority, inadmissible in a state court.
The time between Wolf and Mapp, just twelve years, was small by constitutional standards. It appears that one vital, judicially-found fact, or "judicial
understanding," 52 changed between Wolf and Mapp: whether or not adequate
alternative remedies existed to safeguard the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 5 In Wolf the Court reasoned that states would be able to implement
"equally effective" alternatives to suppression of evidence.54 However, in Mapp
the Court specifically changed its finding in this regard: "It ...plainly appears
that the factual considerations supporting the failure of the Wolf Court to include the ... exclusionary rule when it recognized the enforceability of the right
to privacy against the
States in 1949, ... could not, in any analysis, now be
55
deemed controlling.",
majority does not specifically state this justification, and the omission appears to have been glaring enough that Justice Black wrote his separate concurring opinion to state this justification. This
Author, therefore, disagrees that this justification was relied upon by the majority opinion; regardless, this justification was rejected in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) ("The Fifth
Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time .... ). Professor Norton's second justification was "basic due process"-where there is a right there is a remedy. Id. at
265; see also id. at 262. The third justification, according to Professor Norton, is "the imperative
of judicial integrity." Id. at 265 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). This justification was strongly undermined in at least two opinions written by Justice Powell, starting in
1974 with United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338 (1974). See Stewart, supra note 26, at 139091. Justice Powell examined and rejected the effectiveness of this justification explicitly in Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). There, Justice Powell concluded: "While courts, of course, must
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited
force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence." Id. at 485; see also Stewart, supra note 26, at 1383 ("I do not believe that [preserving judicial integrity] can justify making
the exclusionary rule mandatory on the states."). "[The] fourth justification for the exclusionary
rule [is] deterrence." Id. at 265. Finally, at the heart of Professor Norton's article is the fifth
justification he finds in Mapp's majority: "restoration of the status quo ante." Id. at 266. See also
Stewart, supra note 26, at 1380 (finding three categories of constitutional bases for the exclusionary rule with support in Mapp: "exclusion mandated directly by the Constitution, exclusion to
preserve the integrity of the government, and exclusion as a constitutionally required remedy").
51
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added).
52
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53
This assertion is supported by examining the pre-Mapp exclusionary rule decisions of thenJudge Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals and Judge Traynor of the California Supreme
Court, rejecting and accepting the exclusionary rule respectively. Each opinion turned in large
part on assumptions about the existence and effectiveness of alternate remedies. Compare People
v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 586-87 (N.Y. 1926) ("The officer might have been resisted, or sued for
damages, or even prosecuted for oppression. He was subject to removal or other discipline at the
hands of his superiors. These consequences are undisputed." (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)) with People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1955) ("Experience has demonstrated... that neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing
lawless searches and seizures.").
54
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
55 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).
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The factual considerations to which Justice Frankfurter referred to in the
above passage included the existence of alternative remedies. 56 Upon concluding that there were no adequate alternative remedies at the time of Mapp, the
Court found the exclusionary rule necessary to ensure that the protections of the
Fourth Amendment were not an empty promise.5 7 It can thus be said that the
existence of adequate alternative remedies may be the "touchstone of the inquiry ''58 in determining whether and to what extent the exclusionary rule should
apply to the states. 59 As discussed below, existence of adequate alternative
remedies continues to be, while not an exclusive consideration, an important
consideration in the Court's post-Mapp decisions regarding the exclusionary
rule. 6°
B.

The DeterrenceRationalefor the Exclusionary Rule

The modern purpose of suppressing unlawfully seized evidence is "to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
56

Id. at 651-52.

57

Supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
The author borrows this phrase from Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900
(5th Cir. 1977) (discussing exemptions from regulation under the Securities Act of 1933), a case
in securities law. Justice Stewart used the phrase "The Focus of the Inquiry" when discussing
alternative remedies. Stewart, supra note 26, at 1385. However, his use of the phrase was slightly
different. There, he was not stating that the "existence of adequate alternative remedies" was the
focus of the inquiry so much as the focus upon examining those alternative remedies was to look
at "the present, not the past." Id. Justice Powell did, however, support this Note's assertion that
the "keystone of the inquiry" is the existence of adequate alternative remedies when he stated that
"the Constitution requires only that there be some effective remedy to ensure that agents of the
government obey the fourth amendment. Thus exclusion is constitutionally required only if without it there would be no adequate means to ensure that the government obeys the fourth amendment." Id. (second emphasis added).
59
See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) ("[The Court has not questioned, in the
absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule." (emphasis added));
see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 414
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("If an effective alternative remedy is available, concern for
official observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule."). A cursory
glance at the scholarly debate surrounding the exclusionary rule supports the assertion that the
existence of adequate alternative remedies was the touchstone of the inquiry in determining
whether the exclusionary rule should apply to the states. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 26, at 1385
(stating that "[in considering whether the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required, the inquiry into the existence of adequate alternative remedies must examine the present, not the past"
(second emphasis added)); Amar, supra note 27, at 785-87 (discussing tort remedies in historical
context of Fourth Amendment); Kamisar, In Defense, supra note 25, 123 (stating that "impressive
evidence of the ineffectiveness of the so-called alternatives to the exclusionary rule does exist");
Stewart, supra note 26, at 1388-89 (asserting that "available alternatives to the exclusionary rule.
. do little, if anything, to reduce the likelihood of the vast majority of fourth amendment violations"); see also LAFAVE, supra note 16, at § 1.6 (discussing "remedies ... which are uniquely
directed to the protection of constitutional rights").
60
See infra Part II.A.2.
58
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available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."' 61 As such, the exclusionary rule does not repair damage done by a violation of the Fourth

61

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)) (empha-

sis added); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165-66 (2006) (discussing deterrence
in context of knock-and-announce rule); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)
(stating that "the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures"); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484, 486 (1976) (stating that Mapp "relied principally upon the belief
that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct" and that "[tihe primary justification for
the exclusionary rule ... is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment
rights"); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (stnting that "[tihe rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair");
see also Norton, supra note 27, at 270-80 (discussing deterrence).
This Note does not assert that deterrence is the only purpose to be read from the Supreme
Court's decisions, nor does this Note assert that deterrence should be the purpose of the exclusionary rule. These questions are, as with other aspects of the exclusionary rule, subject to great
debate. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984) ("[T]he prime purpose of
the exclusionary rule ... is to deter future unlawful police conduct .... ") (quoting United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 1051 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("I believe the basis for the exclusionary rule does not derive from its effectiveness as
a deterrent .... "); United States v. Harju, 466 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[C]ommentators
have articulated several purposes served by the rule ... [including] deterrence, judicial integrity
and popular trust in government .. "); Norton, supra note 27, at 283-94 (proposing and arguing
for an alternate "restorative" purpose for the exclusionary rule); Amar, First Principles, supra
note 26, at 800 (rejecting the exclusionary rule as a sound constitutional rule "even if [it] achieves
short-term deterrence"); id. at 796-800 (discussing and rejecting deterrence rationale).
Furthermore, justices and commentators have disputed whether the exclusionary rule actually accomplishes the purpose of deterrence. See generally Stone, 428 U.S. at 492 & n.32 ("Despite the absence of supportive empirical evidence, we have assumed that the immediate effect of
exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment
by removing the incentive to disregard it." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 n.5 (1974) ("There is some disagreement as to the practical efficacy
of the exclusionary rule .. "); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 368-69 & n.6 (1999) ("No one is going to win the empirical
debate over whether the exclusionary rule deters the police from committing a significant number
of illegal searches and seizures."). For a well-known and oft-cited empirical study that concludes
that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is unknown, see Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the
ExclusionaryRule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cn. L. REV. 665, 720 (1970) (examining, in part,
"probable limitations upon the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a means to deter illegal
searches and seizures").
At different times the Court has discussed deterrence as the "justification" for the exclusionary rule versus the "purpose" of the exclusionary rule. Compare Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 ("The
primaryjustification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights." (emphasis added)) with id. at 486 ("But despite the broad deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of
illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons." (emphasis added)). It appears
that while at the time of Mapp the primary justification was the lack of adequate alternative remedies, the Court's analysis has turned primarily to an examination of deterrence, with alternative
remedies becoming simply a factor to examine within the deterrence framework. See infra Part
II.B.
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Amendment. 62 The rule's suppression of evidence is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. 63
Given the strong language of the Court in Mapp-the majority opinion
spoke in terms of constitutional rights and privileges derived from the Fourth
Amendment64-scholars and judges have criticized the Court's practically exclusive focus on deterrence as the rule's purpose in post-Mapp exclusionary rule
decisions.6 5 While deterrence was discussed in Mapp, it was not the focus. 6
Post-Mapp cases, however, firmly establish that deterrence is the modem purpose of the exclusionary rule.6 7

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) ("[Tlhe exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered."
(citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting))); Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 ("Post-Mappdecisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. It is not calculated to
redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any reparation comes
too late." (alterations omitted) (citations omitted)); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)
("[Tihe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes
too late."), disapprovedof on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); Elkins,
364 U.S. at 217 ("The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair."); see also Janis, 428 U.S. at 443
n. 12 (citing cases supporting the same).
63
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting Calandra,414 U.S. at 348); see also Stewart, supra note 26,
at 1390.
64
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
65
See, e.g., Calandra,414 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("This downgrading of the
exclusionary rule to a determination whether its application in a particular type of proceeding
furthers deterrence of future police misconduct reflects a startling misconception, unless it is a
purposeful rejection, of the historical objective and purpose of the rule."); Norton, supra note 27,
at 266 ("[T]he Court in Mapp devoted little attention to deterrence as a justification for the exclusionary rule ... ").
66
See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
67
See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) ('The exclusionary rule is
... a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures."); Leon, 468 U.S. at 906
("The rule ... operates ... through its deterrent effect .... ); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032, 1053 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) ("The exclusionary rule rests on the Court's belief that
exclusion has a sufficient deterrent effect to justify its imposition, and the Court has not abandoned the rule."); Calandra,414 U.S. at 347 ("[T]he rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct .... "); see also Norton, supra note 27, at 266 (noting that the Court has "assigned increasing significance to deterrence" starting with the very first exclusionary rule case
after Mapp). It should also be noted that Mapp itself cited to Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960) for the proposition that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence. See
infra note 86 and accompanying text.
62
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Determining the Scope of the ExclusionaryRule: A Delicate Balance of
Social Costs and Deterrence Benefits

As early as 1969,68 the United States Supreme Court began to develop
the modem test for determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule in a particular situation or proceeding. 69 Shortly thereafter, in the 1974 decision of
United States v. Calandra,the Court ignored the rationale of judicial integrity
and shifted primarily to the deterrence rationale, 70 formulating the modem test
for determining whether the rule should apply in any given situation: to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply, the "potential injury" of suppressing reliable evidence of guilt must be weighed "against the incremental
deterrent effect" of rule's application.7 '
A brief review of three cases assists in the understanding of the Court's
cost-benefits balancing. In the first case, United States v. Calandra,the Court
first explicitly balanced the costs and benefits of exclusion.7 2 The next two
cases, United States v. Leon73 and INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,74 are applications of
the Calandrabalancing test. Examining the birth of the balancing test and its
application frames the discussion of Hudson's impact on the exclusionary rule
jurisprudence.7 5
68

See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) ("[Wie are not convinced that

the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further
encroachment upon the public interest ..." (emphasis added)); see also infra note 69.
69
Stewart, supra note 26, at 1390.
70
See Ashdown, supra note 7, at 759 (discussing the Court's "exclusive focus on the deterrent
impact of the exclusionary rule-as opposed to the interest in judicial integrity").
71 Stewart, supra note 26, at 1391; see Calandra,414 U.S. at 350 (stating that the Court would
"weigh the benefits to be derived from [the] proposed [application] of the exclusionary rule" with
the "potential damage" or social cost occurring as a result of the application); see also Norton,
supra note 27, at 272-73. The year before Calandra, the Court restricted operation of the exclusionary rule by allowing for stop-and-frisk encounters in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The
Court's language in Terry foreshadowed the test applied in Calandra. The Court noted that "in
some contexts the rule is ineffective as a deterrent." Id. at 13. In light of limitations on the rule's
deterrence value, the Court went on to state that "a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control,
may exact a high toll in human injury andfrustrationof efforts to prevent crime." Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The Court here was examining what it would later make clear in Calandra: that
the application of the exclusionary rule should not be applied blindly, but should be applied in
light of the balancing of the social costs of its application against the rule's deterrence value.
Calandra,414 U.S. at 350.
72
Stewart, supra note 26, at 1390-91; see also Norton, supra note 27, at 272 (stating that the
Court began using the balancing approach "[bleginning in earnest with United States v. Calandra").
73
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
74 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
75 There are many other cases that merit consideration on this point. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) ("Application of the exclusionary rule would both
hinder the functioning of state parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible, administrative
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Calandra decided whether the exclusionary rule applied to grand jury
proceedings.76 The Court clearly stated that "the application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served.",77 To determine whether to apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence in grand jury proceedings, the Court weighed
the costs against the benefits. On the side of costs, the Court did not explicitly
consider the general social costs of the exclusionary rule, letting the guilty go
free and suppressing reliable evidence, but rather considered social costs specific to the context of grand jury proceedings: (1) the "potential injury to the
historic role and functions of the grand jury" 78 through "protracted interruption
of grand jury proceedings ' 79 and (2) "undu[e] interfere[nce] with the effective
and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's duties., 80 Regarding the general
social costs of the exclusionary rule,
the Court simply referred to them as al8
ready "hav[ing] been considered.", 1
On the side of benefits, the Court placed the "incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings[.]''82 Given that Mapp excludes from the prosecution's case-in-chief any
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, "it is unrealistic to
assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal" 83:

nature of parole revocation proceedings. The rule would provide only minimal deterrence benefits
in this context, because application of the rule in the criminal trial context already provides significant deterrence of unconstitutional searches. We therefore hold that the federal exclusionary
rule does not bar the introduction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of
parolees' Fourth Amendment rights."); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) ("In
short, we conclude that exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by
a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion. This Court, therefore, is not justified in so extending the exclusionary rule.").
76
414 U.S. 338.
77

78
79

80
81

Id. at 348.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 350 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 351 ("The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the

police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that
judgment." (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1974)).
82
Id. at 351. Because the exclusionary rule already applied to evidence adduced at trial, extending the rule's application to grand jury proceedings "would deter only police investigation
consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation." Id.
83
Id. (emphasis added).
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Whatever deterrence of police misconduct may result from the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it is
unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury
proceedings would significantly further that goal. Such an extension would deter only police investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a
grand jury investigation. The incentive to disregard the requirement of the Fourth Amendment solely to obtain an indictment from a grand jury is substantially negated by the inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent criminal
prosecution of the search victim. For the most part, a prosecutor would be unlikely to request an indictment where a conviction could not be obtained.84
These "additionalbenefits ' 85 of suppressing evidence in grand jury proceedings provided a value that the Court found "uncertain at best," "speculative," and "undoubtedly minimal. 86 In conclusion, the Court held that the nonexistent or de minimus deterrence
benefits did not warrant "substantially imped87
ing the role of the grand jury."
The Supreme Court has applied the Calandrabalancing test to hold that
illegally obtained evidence could be used for impeachment; that
evidence obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth
Amendment rights could be used against a defendant whose
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated; that the testimony
of witnesses located through illegal searches would not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree; ...that good-faith reliance on an unconstitutional substantive criminal statute would
not lead to exclusion of evidence.88
D.

Applying the Balancing Test: United States v. Leon

On July 5, 1984, the Court announced two cases applying the Calandra
balancing test.89 In United States v. Leon, the Court confronted an exclusionary
rule issue well-anticipated by scholars and justices alike9°:

87

Id.
Id. (quoting Aldennan, 394 U.S. at 175) (emphasis added).
Id. at 351-52.
Id. at 352.

88

Norton, supra note 27, at 273 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 272 (stating that the Su-

84
85
86

preme Court has applied the "cost-benefit formula... like a mantra" in the years after Calandra);
Stewart, supra note 26, at 1391.
89
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be
modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in
chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate 9 1but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable
cause.

The Court set forth the Calandra balancing test as the standard to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply to suppress evidence when a
law enforcement officer has acted in good faith:
[This question] must be resolved by weighing the costs and
benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief
of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance
on a search warrant issued by a detached
92 and neutral magistrate
defective.
be
to
found
is
that ultimately
The Court found the social costs to include (1) interfering with the role
of the judge and jury 93 and (2) "allowing some guilty defendants to go free." 94
On the side of benefits, the Court found minimal deterrence: the specter of suppression is unlikely to deter a magistrate whose role is to issue the warrant 95 and
the law enforcement officers who reasonably believe they are engaged in a lawful activity. 96 With these "substantial" general costs and only "marginal or nonexistent" benefits,97 the Court held that exclusion was inappropriate.9 8

See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 26, at 1399-1403 (discussing good-faith exception); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment) ("These developments, born
of years of experience with the exclusionary rule in operation, forcefully suggest that the exclusionary rule be more generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the
reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.").
91
Leon, 468 U.S. at 900.
92
Id. at 906-07.
93 Id. at 907 (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)).
90

94

Id.

95

Id. at 917.

96

Id. at 919. In so finding, the Court stated that "'[the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary

rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.... Where the official action was pursued in
complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force."' Id. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)).
97
Id. at 922.
98
Id. at 926. Similarly strong words have been used to describe the exclusionary rule as a
remedy. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998) (referring to the
exclusionary rule as the "harsh deterrent of exclusion" (emphasis added)).
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In Leon's companion case, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court decided
whether the exclusionary rule should apply to "civil deportation hearing[s]." 99
Applying the Calandrabalancing test, the Court examined the potential deterrence benefits in the context of deportation hearings,1°° finding that the exclusionary rule would not "contribute materially" to deterring Fourth Amendment
violations.' ' Against the finding of minimal deterrence, the Court weighed the
social costs 0 2, which the Court found to be "high."' 10 3 Given the high costs and4
the low benefits, the Court held that exclusionary rule should not be applied.'
468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).
Id. at 1042.
101 Id. at 1046. Initially, the Court noted that the immigration officers who file civil deportation

99

100

actions are often the same officials who violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1043. This fact
would weigh toward finding a high value of deterrence because the law enforcement officers who
might lose their case for lack of evidence were those who violated the law. Id. ("[Tihe exclusionary rule is likely to be most effective when applied to such 'intrasovereign' violations."); cf
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 & n.27 (1976) (discounting deterrence value of suppressing evidence in federal civil proceeding where evidence was seized unlawfully by state law
enforcement officers); but cf Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208, 224 (1960) (holding that
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by state law enforcement officers is inadmissible in federal criminal trials, despite the fact that the violation and the suppression occurred
in different sovereigns).
The Court, however, did not stop there but found the deterrence value reduced by four additional facts. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S, at 1043. First, the Court found that deportation actions
will often succeed even if the evidence is suppressed because the government need only prove
"identity and alienage," both of which can often be proven without resort to the type of evidence
that is suppressed. Id. With regard to identity, the Court noted that evidence of identity cannot be
suppressed. Id. With regard to alienage, the Court referred to the flexibility officers had to prove
this element, including use of inferences drawn from the suspected alien's silence and evidence
seized lawfully or attenuated from the unlawful search or seizure. Id. Second, the Court found
the deterrence value undermined based on the fact that very few illegal aliens received deportation
hearings. Id. at 1044 ("Over 97.5% apparently agree to voluntary deportation without a formal
hearing."). As such, "the arresting officer is most unlikely to shape his conduct in anticipation of
the exclusion of evidence at a formal deportation hearing." Id. The third factor discounting the
value of deterrence was the existence of a "comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations" at the INS, including Fourth Amendment training given to immigration officers;
such training decreased the need for deterrence through suppression. Id. at 1044-45. Finally, the
Court found that alternative remedies existed to diminish the likelihood of violations in the deportation context, including declaratory relief against potentially unconstitutional INS policies. Id. at
1045.
102 The costs that the Court found were (1) permitting an illegal alien to continue committing
the crime of being within the country illegally, id. at 1046-47; (2) interfering with the "simple...
streamlined" system used by the INS for deportations, id. at 1048; and (3) excluding "large
amounts of information that had been obtained... lawfully," id. at 1049.
103 Id. at 1050.
104
Id. at 1051. It is worth noting that Justice O'Connor limited the holding, suggesting that the
Court was willing to revisit its conclusions if the need for deterrence became greater. Id. at 1050.
("Our conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule's value might change, if there developed good
reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread." (emphasis
added)).
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Leon and Lopez-Mendoza raise several key points about the exclusionary rule.
As a general matter, these decisions evidence the difficult and unclear nature of
applying the Calandra balancing test, a standard requiring the weighing and
quantifying
of concepts as nebulous as "social costs" and "deterrence bene05
fits."1
Leon and Lopez-Mendoza both applied the costs-balancing test, and
both came out in favor of limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule.' ° Emblematic of the difficulty of applying the balancing test is the fact that Justice
White, who wrote the majority opinion in Leon, 10 7 wrote a strong dissent in Lopez-Mendoza. 10 8 His stance with the majority on the one hand, the scope of the
exclusionary rule, and his dissent on the other, opposing a limitation on the rule,
show the difficulty, and possibly the unmanageability, of balancing costs and
benefits to determine the scope of the exclusionary rule. Justice White wrote in
Leon that "the extreme sanction of exclusion"'1 9 should not apply because the
"marginal or nonexistent benefits" did not "justify the substantial costs of exclusion" in the context of the good-faith exception. 110 The decision required a
"weighing [of] the costs and benefits" of the previously mentioned factors to
determine the result."' In Lopez-Mendoza he wrote in dissent, "the conclusion
of the majority is based upon an incorrect assessment of the costs and benefits

. ,,112

The Author does not suggest that Justice White was in any way applying contradictory standards in his two opinions; rather, Justice White's differing
opinions on the results of the cost-benefits balance in two decisions issued on
the same day reflect the difficulty of making these decisions. The "weighing"
performed by Justice White in Leon and the "assessment" with which he disagreed in Lopez-Mendoza show that the outcome of the application of the costsbenefits balancing test will often be determined by a value judgment; such value
judgments are both prone to vociferous attack and are core to the Supreme
Court's current exclusionary rule jurisprudence.
The difficulty of applying the balancing test may underlie the inclination of some justices to prescribe rules to define the scope of the exclusionary
105

More cynically, these two cases show that applying a standard requiring balancing of costs

and benefits leaves judges with remarkable amounts of discretion. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standardsand ConstitutionalMeaning, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1274, 1295 (2006)
(asserting that balancing of costs and benefits to determine whether a particular standard is judicially manageable leaves a court in that balancing step with the very discretion that courts seek to
limit by seeking judicially manageable standards).
106
See supra Part II.C (discussing Leon and Lopez-Mendoza).
107
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 897 (1984).
108
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1052-60 (White, J., dissenting).
109

110
III
112

Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1052 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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rule, discarding then the costs-benefits balancing standard."l 3 However, Leon
and Lopez-Mendoza show that the Court has continued to apply a costs-benefits
balancing. Recognizing the difficulty of applying the Calandra test, Justice
Blackmun stated:
If a single principle may be drawn from this Court's exclusionary rule decisions, ... it is that the scope of the exclusionary
rule is subject to change in light of changing judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the confines of the
courtroom."14
Justice O'Connor's similar statement in Lopez-Mendoza' 15 supports the assertion that the Court is willing to reevaluate its exclusionary rule decisions and the
assumptions underlying their scope.
The difficulty of applying the Calandrabalancing test" 6 militates for a
clear understanding of what factors the Court places on the side of costs and the
side of benefits. On the side of costs, while Calandradid not explicitly weigh
the general social costs of the exclusionary rule,' 17 Leon squarely considered the
113

For example, Justice White sought to differentiate between "collateral" and non-collateral

proceedings in distinguishing Lopez-Mendoza from Calandraand other precedents. Id. at 1053
(White, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan excoriated the balancing test, stating,
The Court seeks to justify this result on the ground that the "costs" of adhering
to the exclusionary rule in cases like those before us exceed the "benefits."
But the languageof deterrenceand of cost/benefit analysis, if used indiscriminately, can have a narcotic effect. It creates an illusion of technical precision
and ineluctability. It suggests that not only constitutional principle but also
empirical data support the majority's result. When the Court's analysis is examined carefully, however, it is clear that we have not been treated to an honest assessment of the merits of the exclusionary rule, but have instead been
drawn into a curious world where the "costs" of excluding illegally obtained
evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the "benefits" of such exclusion are made to disappear with a mere wave of the hand.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Brennan further
stated,
Thus, in this bit of judicial stagecraft, while the sets sometimes change, the actors always have the same lines. Given this well-rehearsed pattern, one might
have predicted with some assurance how the present case would unfold. First
there is the ritual incantation of the "substantial social costs" exacted by the
exclusionary rule, followed by the virtually foreordained conclusion that,
given the marginal benefits, application of the rule in the circumstances of
these cases is not warranted.
Id. at 928.
114 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
115
Supra note 104.
116 Supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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general social costs of the exclusionary rule in evaluating the costs of suppression in the context of the good-faith exception.11 8 Explicit consideration of
these general social costs tends to greatly favor limitation of the exclusionary
rule.1 19
Leon was not the first post-Mapp case in which the Court placed the
general social costs on the "costs" side of the balance. 120 For instance, in Stone
v. Powell the Court also directly weighed the general social costs of suppression
of reliable evidence to hold that "where the State has provided an opportunity
for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."1 21 Together,
Leon and Stone v. Powell show that although the Court in Calandrahad discussed the general social costs only in passing,1 22 the consideration of these
costs has been critical to establishing the scope of the exclusionary rule.
Also with regard to the social costs side of the balance, Leon and LopezMendoza discuss these costs in grave language. 23 The Court's concern with the
118
119

120

See supranotes 93-94 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts VI.A and VI.B.
In addition to Stone v. Powell, discussed infra note 121 and accompanying text, see, e.g.,

United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976) ("Clearly, the enforcement of admittedly valid
laws would be hampered by so extending the exclusionary rule, and, as is nearly always the case
with the rule, concededly relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered unavailable.") and
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1969) ("W]e are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.").
121
428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (footnotes omitted). Justice Powell discussed the general social
costs of suppression at great length, stating,
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct review
are well known: the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants
therein, are diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that
should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and often
frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed
by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the
concept of justice.
Id. at 489-90 (footnotes omitted).
122
See supranote 81 and accompanying text.
123 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) ("The substantialsocial costs exacted
by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source
of concern." (emphasis added)); id. at 922 (referring to the "substantial costs of exclusion"); id. at
907 (referring to "objectionable collateral consequence[s]" of exclusion); INS. v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984) (referring to "unusual and significant" social costs).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/10

20

Rayburn: What is "Blowing in the Wind"? Reopening the Exclusionary Rule De

2008]

REOPENING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE

costs of suppression, in combination with the Court's above-noted willingness
to reevaluate the balancing of costs and benefits as circumstances change, 2 4
suggests that the Court may lean toward finding the social costs high in comparison with deterrence benefits.
On the benefits side of the balance, Leon and Lopez-Mendoza establish
two principles with regard to how the Court measures the deterrence value of
applying the rule in given context. First, the Court examines the value only of
any "additional deterrence"'' 25 or any "incremental deterrent effect"' 126 that applying the exclusionary rule will have. 27 In Leon, the Court reaffirmed the
proposition that the suppression of evidence from the prosecution's case in chief
will deter law enforcement officers from committing unconstitutional searches
and seizures.128 Justice White then went to great lengths to discuss the various
cases where the Court held that extending the exclusionary rule to a particular
context would not provide sufficient additional deterrence to warrant application of the exclusionary rule in that context. 129 To extend the rule to a context
outside the prosecution's case in chief, the Court requires a showing that
an
30
officer would be additionally deterred sufficiently to warrant suppression.
The Court's method of valuing deterrence, however, "ignores ...the
incremental deterrent effect that application of the rule to all proceedings would
have." ' 3' Justice Brennan took serious issue with this method of calculating the
value of deterrence in his dissent in Leon. 132 He asserted that the incremental
benefits of the exclusionary rule are found in the rule's "tendency to promote
institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements on the part of
law enforcement agencies generally."'' 33 Such institutional deterrence 134 finds
incremental value through its broad application, and institutional deterrence is
weakened by failing to suppress evidence in other proceedings. 135 However
sound it would be to maximize deterrence in this fashion, the majority in Leon
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046 (emphasis added) (quoting Janis,428 U.S. at 458).
Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
See also Janis,428 U.S. at 453 ("additional marginal deterrence").
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 908.
Id. at 908-13.
See Ashdown, supra note 7, at 760 ("In all of these cases, the principal foundation for the

position of the majority was that to the extent the exclusionary rule deters officers from violating
the Fourth Amendment, the focus of the law enforcement mindset is on the introduction of evidence at the criminal trial and on appeal; tangential proceedings are not seriously considered by
law enforcement officials in the deterrent equation.").
131
Id.
132
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 948-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 953 (emphasis added).
134
See id. at 954 (referring to deterrence as an "institutionwide mechanism"); id. at 954 n.12
(referring to "systematic deterrence" (quoting Stewart, supra note 26, at 1400)).
135 See id. at 953-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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makes clear that the Court will weigh the value of deterrence based on how
much additional deterrence will accrue by suppressing evidence in a specific
context. 136
Leon and Lopez-Mendoza provide a second principle regarding the
method of valuing the deterrence benefits in this balancing. The value of deterrence directly corresponds to the need for deterrence, and alternative remedies
diminish the need for, and thus the value of, deterrence. 13 As the Court reevaluates the scope of the exclusionary rule "in light of changing judicial understanding,"' 38 the existence of truly adequate alternative remedies would decrease
the need for the suppression of evidence as the primary means of ensuring that
the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not an "empty promise.' 39 A
corollary to this point is that as circumstances change, the value of deterrence in
a particular context may decrease or increase. 14° Justice White stated that the
exclusionary rule's "continued application" is "substantial and deliberate," but
only "in the absence of a more efficacious sanction."' 14 Thus, both the social
costs and the
deterrence value of suppression will continue to be reevaluated by
42
the Court. 1
Calandra, Leon, and Lopez-Mendoza represent the framework the Supreme Court has used to weigh the social costs and deterrence benefits. Based
on present day circumstances, 43 the Court weighs the costs by considering both
the general social costs of suppression along with any specific social costs of the
rule's application in a given context. 144 The Court values deterrence value based
on any additional deterrence provided by suppressing evidence in a given situation, discounting
the benefit if alternative remedies exist to decrease the need for
45
1
deterrence.
136 See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045 (1984) ("[T]he deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings is undermined by the availability of alternative remedies
for institutional practices by the INS that might violate Fourth Amendment rights. The INS is a
single agency, under central federal control, and engaged in operations of broad scope but highly
repetitive character. The possibility of declaratory relief against the agency thus offers a means
for challenging the validity of INS practices, when standing requirements for bringing such an
action can be met.").
138
Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
139 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,660 (1961).
140 See supra notes 114 and 115 and accompanying text. See also Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at
1050 ("Our conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule's value might change, if there developed
good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread."
(emphasis added)).
141
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908-09 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
142
See supra notes 112 and 114 and accompanying text.
137

143 Stewart, supra note 26, at 1385 ("[E]xistence of adequate alternative remedies" must focus
on "the present, not the past.").
144 See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
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III. THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE

The knock-and-announce rule, "[t]he common-law principle that law
enforcement officers must announce their presence and provide residents an
opportunity to open the door,' 146 is derived from English common law. 47 It
predates the year 1275,148 and scholars 149 and judges'5 0 generally look to the
1603 decision in Semayne's Case'5' for the core principles behind the rule. The
principles settled by Semayne's Case, relevant to the knock-and-announce rule,
include the following:
(1) Every man's house is his castle, and defense of that
house may extend even to death, and it is not a felony.
(3) Yet the liberty of the house does not hold against the
King, and so for felony or suspicion of felony, or to do execution of the King's process, after signifying the cause of his coming and requesting the doors to be152opened, a sheriff may break
and enter, if admission is refused.
In Miller v. United States,'53 the Supreme Court first recognized the
knock-and-announce rule. 1 4 Many states had already enacted knock-and-

146

Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).

147 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (stating that "the common law generally protected

a man's house as [his castle]"); see also Kempker, supra note 6, at 790 (discussing knock-andannounce rule in context of Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2005) (establishing totalityof-the-circumstances test as standard for determining when exigent circumstances authorize warrant no-knock entry)).
148
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 932 n.2. Specifically, Justice Thomas noted that
[The] "knock and announce" principle appears to predate even Semayne's
Case, which is usually cited as the judicial source of the common-law standard. Semayne's Case itself indicates that the doctrine may be traced to a
statute enacted in 1275, and that at that time the statute was but an affirmance
of the common law.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
149 See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v.
United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 500 (1964) ("[Semayne's Case] has
long been the leading decision interpreting the [knock-and-announce rule].").
150
See, e.g., Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-32 (looking to Semayne's Case in holding that knock-andannounce rule forms part of Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry).
151 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
152
Blakey, supra note 149, at 500.
153 357 U.S. 301 (1958) (applying District of Columbia law).
154
Kempker, supra note 6, at 791 ("The Supreme Court first addressed [the knock-andannounce rule] in Miller v. United States.").
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announce statutes,155 and the federal version, codified for the first time in 1917,
resided in Section 3109 of Title 18.156 However, it was only in 1995 that the
Supreme Court held that the knock-and-announce rule was a factor in the reasonableness inquiry of the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
Although the Court recognized the knock-and-announce rule in Miller,
it was not until almost four decades later that the Court incorporated the knockand-announce rule into the Fourth Amendment in Wilson v. Arkansas.'57 Justice
Thomas examined the common law and found "no doubt that the reasonableness
of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to entering.""' The Court
recognized two additional principles of the knock-and-announce rule. First, the
knock-and-announce rule helped to avoid unnecessary property damage. 159 Second, the requirement would yield under circumstances where police officers
were in danger of physical harm160 or where evidence may be destroyed if they
knock-and-announce. 161 These exceptions have generally been63 termed "exigent
circumstances"' 162 exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule.1

See Miller, 357 U.S. at 308-09 n.8 (collecting citations to state statutes enacting knock-andannounce provisions).
156
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000). Section 3109 reads:
155

The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
Id.
See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
Id. at 931.
159
Id. at 935-36 (citing Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 196 (K.B. 1603)).
160
Id. at 936.
161
Id. at 936; see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963) (plurality opinion) (holding
that entry did not render arrest unlawful where officers "entered quietly and without announcement, in order to prevent the destruction of contraband"); People v. Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal.
1956) ("Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, and no basic
constitutional guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds in getting to a place where he is
entitled to be more quickly than he would, had he complied with [the knock-and-announce
rule]."). Hudson v. Michigan summarized the exigent circumstances rule, stating that the knockand-announce rule "is not necessary when circumstances present a threat of physical violence, or
if there is reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given,
or if knocking and announcing would be futile." 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2612-63 (2006) (quotation
marks omitted) (alterations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
162
See Ker, 374 U.S. at 40.
163 See, e.g., Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 n.3 (referring to the phrase "exigent circumstances" from
157

158

Ker); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (referring to "exigent circumstances" as
"justification for noncompliance" with the knock-and-announce rule).
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IV. THE CASE OF HUDSON V. MICHIGAN: THE INTERSECTION OF THE
KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

On August 27, 1998, seven police officers executed a search warrant for
narcotics at Booker Hudson's home. 164 Although the officers had no "reason to
believe that anyone in the home would attempt to destroy evidence, escape, or
resist the execution of the warrant," when they arrived, they announced their
presence and authority 65 and entered a few seconds later. 66 Upon entering,
they seized from Hudson drugs and a loaded gun that was located in the chair in
which he was sitting. 167 Michigan conceded that the officers violated the knockand-announce rule, and the United States Supreme Court granted
review to de68
termine whether the evidence should have been suppressed.1
After starting by discussing the "now familiar"'169 Calandra balancing
test, the majority opinion 170 articulated three reasons for why the exclusionary
rule should not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce rule. First, a violation of the knock-and-announce rule is "not a but-for cause of obtaining the
evidence"' 7 1 (the "causation" rationale). Second, the interests protected by the
knock-and-announce rule "would not be served by suppression of the evidence"' 72 (the "interest" rationale). And third, while "the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule ... are considerable[,] the incentive to [commit] such
violations is minimal[,] ... and the extant deterrences against them are substantial' ' 173 (the "cost-benefit" rationale).

164
165

Brief for Petitioner at 2, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006) (No. 04-1360).

166

Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162.

167

Id.

168
169
170

Id. at 2163.

173

Id. at 2168.

Id.

Ashdown, supra note 7, at 778.
It is important to note that Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court was a majority opinion in
respect to all parts setting forth the rationales discussed in this Note. See infra notes 171-73 and
accompanying text. Hudson v. Michigan was decided by a 5-4 vote. 126 S. Ct. at 2159. Joining
in Justice Scalia's majority opinion were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito. Id. Justice Kennedy did not join in Part IV of Justice Scalia's opinion, which examined three previous Supreme Court cases that Justice Scalia discussed in support of the outcome.
Id. at 2168-70. A dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Breyer, with Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg joining. Id. at 2171-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171
Id. at 2164 (majority opinion).
172
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164.
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The Attenuation Rationales

Justice Scalia's assertion regarding the causation rationale is terse and
undeveloped, 74 and serves primarily to introduce the interest rationale. 175 He
states,
In this case, of course, the constitutional violation of an illegal
manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining evidence.
Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, 76and
would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house.'
The dissent disputes Justice Scalia's conclusion regarding causation, stating that
"what [the] police might have done had they not behaved unlawfully" is "beside
the point."'177 The Court must look at "what they did do," and whether there was
"set in motion an independent chain of events that would have inevitably led to
the discovery and seizure of the evidence despite, and independent of, that behavior."' 7 8 Because the possible legal entry according to the valid search war79
rant never occurred, causation does not bar the suppression of the evidence.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion goes into much greater depth to examine the interest rationale. Even if a constitutional violation is the but-for cause
of discovery of evidence, the causation "can be too attenuated to justify exclusion." 80 Attenuation can happen "when the causal connection is remote"
("causal attenuation") or "when ... the interest protected by the constitutional

guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained" ("interest attenuation").' 81 Justice Scalia applies182interest attenuation to further find that the evidence should not be suppressed.
174 Id. at 2164. The dissenting opinion, in contrast, spends several pages examining the causa-

tion rationale. See id. at 2177-79 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). For a good overview of the dissent, see
Fourth Amendment-Exclusionary Rule, supra note 16, at 177-78.
175
See infra notes 180-92 and accompanying text.
176
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164.
177 Id. at 2179 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
178

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

179

Id.

180 Id. at 2164 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 274-75

(1978)).
181
Id. at 2164. Interest attenuation was established by the Court in Ceccolini,435 U.S. at 279.
where then-Justice Rehnquist held that
considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles which it is designed to protect must play a factor in the attenuation analysis ....The penalties visited upon the Government, and in turn upon the public, because its officers have violated the law must bear some relation to the
purposes which the law is to serve.
182 Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2165.
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Applying interest attenuation, Justice Scalia listed the interests protected
by the Search and Seizure Clause as the right of "citizens [to] shield 'their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' from the government's scrutiny."' 83 The interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule-"the protection of human life
and limb, '184 "the protection of property,"'' 85 and the protection of "those ele' 86 ments of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance"'
are not those protected by the Fourth Amendment. Because the interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule do not include "one's interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a187warrant," Justice Scalia concludes that "the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.'
Justice Breyer takes serious issue with the interest attenuation portion of
the majority opinion.188 He rejects the concept of interest attenuation, 89 stating
that it waters down the knock-and-announce rule's "constitutional values, purposes, and objectives.'' 190 Applying interest attenuation misses the point that
because the entry was unlawful, the search was unlawful, and as such suppreshe states that the interest attenuation rationsion is mandated.' 9 1 In conclusion,
192
precedent.
by
supported
ale is not
The Cost-Benefits Rationale

B.

The majority opinion could have concluded after either the discussion
of the causation rationale or the discussion of the interest rationale. 93 However,
Justice Scalia went on to find a third, independent and adequate' 94 ground for
183

Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).

184 Id.
185 Id.

Id. Specifically, on this point Justice Scalia quotes Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385,
393 n.5 (1997), which states, "[tihe brief interlude between announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed." Hudson,
126 S. Ct. at 2165.
187 Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
188 See also Ashdown, supra note 7, at 778 ("[Justice Scalia] ... reached the questionable
conclusion that the interests served by the rule ... would not be served directly by the exclusion
of the evidence obtained." (emphasis added)).
189
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2180 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority gives the word 'attenuation' a new meaning .... ).
190 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191
Id. at 2181.
186

192

Id.

193 Fourth Amendment-Exclusionary Rule, supra note 16, at 178 ("The majority could have
held more narrowly that there was no causal link between the violation and the discovery of evidence."); cf. People v. Rodriguez, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 811, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (reading Hudson's discussion of adequate alternative remedies as dicta).
194
See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165. Justice Scalia appears to consider his cost-benefit analysis
of the application of the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations as a separate grounds
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holding the exclusionary rule to be inapplicable to violations of the knock-andannounce rule: the cost-benefit rationale. 95 "[T]he exclusionary rule has never
been applied
except 'where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social
96
costs.'"

In weighing the costs of suppression, Justice Scalia included general social costs, "exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence" resulting in "releasing
dangerous criminals into society,"'' 97 as well as costs specific to the knock-andannounce context: overwhelming litigation over alleged violations, 98 increased
danger to law enforcement officers, 199 and greater "destruction of evidence.'
These costs were found to be "considerable. '2 '
Against these social costs, Justice Scalia weighed the deterrence benefits. First, he considered the need for deterrence. The only result of failing to
knock-and-announce is "the prevention of destruction of evidence and the
avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of the premises-dangers
which, if there is even 'reasonable suspicion' of their existence, suspend the
knock-and-announce requirementanyway. 2 °2 In other words, if officers have
reasonable suspicion of these dangers, they may forgo knocking and announcing; thus, the incentive to violate the rule is minimal, so the need for deterrence
is correspondingly decreased.20 3
Justice Scalia then considered the need for deterrence based on potential
alternative remedies that exist in the present day: "We cannot assume that ex-

for suppressing the evidence in the case, beginning this portion of the opinion by stating, "[q]uite
apartfrom the requirement of unattenuated causation, the exclusionary rule has never been applied except where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs." Id. (quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis added).
195
See id.
196
Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (quotation marks
omitted)).
197
Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2165.
198 Id. at 2166. Specifically, Justice Scalia states that it would generate a "flood of alleged
failures to observe the rule, and claims that any asserted ... justification for a no-knock entry had
inadequate support." Id. (citations omitted). The litigation in knock-and-announce violations,
requiring an examination of nebulous standards, including "reasonable wait time," id. (quoting
United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003)), and "reasonable suspicion," would be more
expensive than examining whether "there was or was not a warrant" or whether "the Miranda
warning was given, or not." Id.
199 Id. This cost is premised on the proposition that excluding evidence where a violation in the
knock-and-announce rule occurred would result in "police officers' refraining from timely entry
after knocking and announcing . . .[because] the amount of time they must wait is necessarily
uncertain." Id.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 2165.
202
Id. at 2166.
203

Id.
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clusion in this context is necessary deterrence simply because
we found that it
'2 4
was necessary deterrence in different contexts and long ago. 0
First, Justice Scalia remarked that increased availability of civil suits
and "attorney's fees for civil-rights plaintiffs"2 0 5 provide alternative remedies
for search and seizure violations, resulting in diminished need for deterrence
through suppression. Justice Scalia referred to several landmark civil rights
cases and statutes that were not enacted or decided until after the decision in
Mapp.2°6 He emphasized that at the time of Mapp a plaintiff could not seek
damages from municipalities, 2 7 and it was not until several years after Mapp
that a plaintiff could recover attorney's fees in such a suit.2°8 "As far as we
know, civil liability is an effective deterrent here ....,,209 The availability of
effective deterrence through civil suits diminishes the need for deterrence
through suppression. 1 0
In addition to increased ability to bring civil suits, Justice Scalia pointed
to "the increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on
internal police discipline" as a factor diminishing the need for deterrence
through suppression.21 Law enforcement officers of the twenty-first century are
taught to "respect constitutional guarantees, '212 and failure to provide such training "exposes municipalities to financial liability. 2 13 He also pointed to mechanisms providing for "citizen review" as providing additional deterrence.21 a In
sum, the changing face of the police force has resulted in a diminished need for
deterrence through the external sanction of suppression.
Justice Scalia concludes the balancing of costs and benefits, stating,
"the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are considerable; the incentive to such violations is minimal to begin with,
204

Id. at 2167. Justice Scalia's examination of remedies as they exist at the time of the deci-

sion is consistent with then-retired Justice Stewart's statement that "[i]n considering whether the
exclusionary rule is constitutionally required, the inquiry into the existence of adequate alternative
remedies must examine the present, not the past." Stewart, supra note 26, at 1385; see also supra
note 104 (referring to Justice O'Connor's willingness to revisit the conclusion in Lopez-Mendoza
if needed).
205
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166-68.
206 Id. at 2167-68.
207
Id. at 2167 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (establishing municipal liability
under 18 U.S.C. § 1983)).
208
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
209
Id. at 2167-68.
210

Id.

211

Id. at 2168.

212

Id.

213

Id. (citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) ("We hold today that the inadequacy

of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability.., where the failure to train amounts
to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.")).
214
Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2168.
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and the extant deterrences against them are substantial .... Resort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified. 2t 5
Justice Breyer rejects the application of the Calandra balancing test,
preferring to categorize previous exceptions to the exclusionary rule into two
discrete categories.21 6 The first category of exceptions includes those opinions
in which the Court has refused to suppress evidence outside of the context of
criminal trial proceedings,1 7 like in grand jury proceedings. 1 8 This category
does not apply because Hudson involves an ordinary criminal trial.21 9
The second category of exclusionary rule exceptions under Justice
Breyer's approach includes contexts where the exclusionary rule would result in
no "appreciable deterrence,, 220 like the good-faith exception. 22 These exceptions turn only on whether or not suppression in a given context would lack deterrence.22 2 Justice Breyer finds that deterrence can be expected by suppressing
evidence seized in violation of the knock-and-announce rule.223 He rejects any
balancing of the "substantial social costs" of suppression against the deterrence
benefits, stating that it is "an argument that [the] Court ... has consistently rejected. 224 The implication is that if the Court actually weighed the social costs
into its exclusionary rule balancing, the costs would always outweigh the benefits, and the exclusionary rule would cease to exist. Justice Breyer, thus, would
have the Court examine only the deterrence benefits prong of the Calandrabalancing test, and in this case, he would find the deterrence benefits to exist,
thereby supporting application of the rule.225
215

Id.

216

Id. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

217

Id. at 2175.

See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2176 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
220
Id. at 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454
(1976)).
221
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
222
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2176 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (characterizing the lack of deterrence as
218
219

the "critical ... rationale").
223
Id. ("[T]here is no reason to think that, in the case of knock-and-announce violations by the
police, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors ...
(quotation
marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
224

Id. at 2177.

225

See id. at 2175-77. It should be noted that Justice Kennedy's concurrence provides some
mixed relief to supporters of the exclusionary rule. Fourth Amendment-Exclusionary Rule,
supra note 16, at 183 n.81 ("Justice Kennedy's concurrence cast some doubt on whether the
Court, at least as it is currently constituted, has five votes to eliminate the exclusionary rule.").
Although he joined in all parts of Justice Scalia's opinion discussed herein, see supra note 170,
Justice Kennedy stated that "the continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt," Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
While some read this portion of his concurrence to indicate that the votes might not exist to overrule the exclusionary rule, see supra, others question this conclusion, given that Justice Kennedy
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V.

HUDSON'S IMPACT ON THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE

The knock-and-announce rule is, at least in name, a constitutional
rule,226 but Hudson makes clear that suppression of evidence is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of the knock-and-announce protections.227 Various
courts have dealt with knock-and-announce cases since Hudson was decided,
and these decisions indicate that Hudson may have greatly diminished the constitutional protections of the rule.228
Several courts have extended Hudson to other knock-and-announce contexts.229 In United States v. Southerland, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that where an officer executes a warrant in
violation of the federal knock-and-announce statute, evidence seized need not be
suppressed. 230 The court reasoned that the extension of Hudson to the federal
statute was warranted because the federal statute simply embodied the commonlaw knock-and-announce doctrine.23'
The First Circuit Court of Appeals extended Hudson to the execution of
232 The Fourth Amendment
arrest warrants in United States v. Pelletier.
does not
require suppression where law enforcement officers violate the knock-andannounce rule "in the course of executing an arrest warrant. 233 The panel reajoined the majority opinion in all aspects discussed above, see Moran, supra note 6, at 307-08
(noting that Justice Kennedy "joined the very parts of Justice Scalia's opinion that cast doubt on
the exclusionary rule"); LAFAVE, supra note 16 ("[Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion] provides little solace when it is considered how many other types of Fourth Amendment violations
could easily be encompassed within a comparably slipshod deterrence/costs balancing.").
226 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
227 Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
228 David Moran, who represented Booker Hudson in Hudson v. Michigan, Moran, supra note
6, at 283, asserts that the knock-and-announce rule is not only diminished in strength, but has been
put to rest. Id. at 304-05. He states that,"[b]efore turning to the broader implications of the Hudson decision, I think it worthwhile to briefly eulogize the knock-and-announce rule. A eulogy is
appropriate because I do not believe anyone can seriously deny that the knock-and-announce rule
is now dead in the United States." Id.; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 20 ("There is still a
right to have the police refrain from entering without knocking and announcing, but the absence of
any realistic remedy for violations is sure to make the rule a practical nullity.").
229 United States v. Acosta, 502 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2007) (extending Hudson to violations of 18
U.S.C. § 3109 (codifying the common-law knock-and-announce doctrine)); United States v.
Bruno, 487 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Southerland, 466 F.3d 1083 (D.C.
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1361 (2007) (same); United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194,
196 (1st Cir. 2006) (extending Hudson to "knock and announce violation[s] committed in the
course of executing an arrest warrant"); United States v. Smith, 457 F. Supp. 2d 802, 804-06 (E.D.
Mich. 2006) (extending Hudson to knock-and-announce violation occurring during warrantless
search of "inmate with community status ... held by an electronic tether" on grounds that inmate
had no reasonable expectation of privacy).
230

Supra note 229.

231 Southerland, 466 F.3d at 1084.
232 Pelletier,469 F.3d at 196.
233

1J
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soned that as a search warrant grants law enforcement officers the authority to
enter the location to be searched to execute the warrant, an arrest warrant grants
law enforcement officers the authority to enter the defendant's residence 234 "so
long as there is reason to believe that the [defendant] is inside. 2 35 Southerland
and Pelletierseem to be elementary and non-problematic extensions of Hudson,
insofar as one accepts the reasoning of Hudson.236
More disturbing than the above extensions of Hudson, however, are the
next set of knock-and-announce cases, which tend to support Justice Breyer's
statement that Hudson "weakens, perhaps destroys, much of the practical value
of the Constitution's knock-and-announce protection. '237 Initially, in the wake
of Hudson, three Courts of Appeals presented with knock-and-announce violations held that no violation had occurred, and as such they had no reason to apply Hudson.238 In contrast to those early cases, however, four Courts of Appeals
confronted with knock-and-announce violations have noted that Hudson does
not require suppression for violations of the knock-and-announce rule, thereby
disposing of the Fourth Amendment claims without further examination. 9

234

235
236
237

Id. at 199-201.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 196 ("[Tlhe Hudson Court's reasoning mandates such an extension.").
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2171 (2006) (Breyer, J.,dissenting); see also Daniel

A. Gutin, Note, Technical Knockout: Hudson v. Michigan and the Unfortunate Demise of the
Knock-And-Announce Rule, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239 (2007); David Cam, Casenote, Hey Officer, Didn't Someone Teach You to Knock? The Supreme Court Says No Exclusion of Evidence for
Knock-And-Announce Violations in Hudson v. Michigan, 58 MERCER L. REV. 779 (2007); J.
Spencer Clark, Comment, Hudson v. Michigan: "Knock-and-Announce"-An Outdated Rule?, 21
BYU J. PUB. L. 433 (2007); Monica Ball Jackson, Note, The Demise of the Knock-And-Announce
Rule, 11 T.G. JONES L. REV. 55 (2006); Criminal ProcedureSurvey, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 797, 80911 (2007) ("[A] substantial deterrent to performing no-knock entries has been washed
away ....); Brian S. Uholik, Comment, Who Cares If It's Open?: Hudson v. Michigan and the
United States Supreme Court's Evisceration of the Knock and Announce Rule, 112 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 261 (2007); Rachel Rediker, ConstitutionalLaw - The "Knock and Announce" Rule Becomes Obsolete - Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006), 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADvoc. 203 (2006).
238
See United States v. Brathwaite, 458 F.3d 376, 379 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that no
knock-and-announce violation occurred, and not arriving to the question of suppression under
Hudson); United States v. Gaver, 452 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006) (refusing to determine
whether knock-and-announce violation occurred because suppression is not appropriate under
Hudson); United States v. Esser, 451 F.3d 1109, 1113 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (referring to Hudson
but holding that no knock-and-announce violation occurred, and thus finding no need to apply
Hudson); see also United States v. Sublet, slip op. 05-20912, 2006 WL 3825662, at *1 (5th Cir.
Dec. 27, 2006) (citing Hudson but holding knock-and-announce rule not violated on plain error
review).
239
See United States v. Mendizabal, slip op. 05-6887, 2006 WL 3741185 (6th Cir. Dec. 20,
2006) (applying Hudson to knock-and-announce violation); United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55,
61 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying Hudson to knock-and-announce violation, citing interest attenuation and "marginal societal benefit"); United States v. Ramirez, 196 F. App'x 538, 539 (9th
Cir. 2006) (applying Hudson to claim of knock-and-announce violation); United States v. Brown,
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These cases underscore a collateral effect of Hudson: courts no longer
need to examine the myriad issues that accompany officers' execution of search
warrants where they fail to knock-and-announce, at least not in criminal suppression hearings. 240 By avoiding the constitutional issue of whether law enforcement officers violated the knock-and-announce rule, these courts avoid
unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions. However, the exact dimensions of the knock-and-announce protections will remain undecided as a
result, unless resolved in civil actions 241 or pursuant to state constitutional protections.24 2 Unless and until such avenues fill the void, law enforcement officers
will have little guidance on how to respect this crucial Fourth Amendment protection.243
These collateral effects of Hudson support Justice Breyer's concern that
Hudson effectively writes the knock-and-announce rule out of the Fourth
Amendment. 244 The treatment that lower courts have given the knock-and189 F. App'x 722, 724 (10th Cir. 2006) (refusing to determine whether exigent circumstances
justified no-knock warrant and simply ruling that suppression was not appropriate).
240
See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162-63 (discussing the difficulty of applying the knock-andannounce rule and stating, "[hiappily, these issues do not confront us here"); State v. Savage, 906
A.2d 1054, 1057 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) ("This case had promise of leading us to a hidden
treasure trove of intriguing nuances about the phenomenon (or phenomena) of knocking and announcing, had not that inquiry been unceremoniously short-circuited by Hudson v. Michigan."
(citations omitted)).
241
See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68 (discussing civil suits for violations of the knock-andannounce rule).
242
See supra note 240 and accompanying text; cf. State v. Babcock, 718 N.W.2d 624, 630 n.*
(S.D. 2006) (holding that failure to knock-and-announce was warranted, thereby obviating need to
determine application of Hudson under state constitution); State v. Harrell, 2006 WL 3290432, at
*4-5 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2006) (same). For an example of a state court, post-Hudson,
choosing to define the knock-and-announce protections to include suppression, see State v. Vargas, 149 P.3d 961 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (reversing denial of suppression motion on state constitutional grounds where exigent circumstances did not justify failure to comply with knock-andannounce requirements).
243
Cf. Kamisar, supra note 25, at 123-26 (discussing the reaction of law enforcement to the
decision of Mapp v. Ohio and concluding that law enforcement is "unfamiliar with and uninterested in the law of search and seizure" when courts do not suppress evidence); see also Reginald
Fields, Police Benefit from Ruling, Court Told Search Need Not Be Perfect, PLAIN DEALER, Feb.
15, 2007, at B1 (relating positive police reactions to Ohio Supreme Court's application of Hudson
in drug cases).
244
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2182 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Wilson v. Arkansas held the knock-and-announce rule part of the Fourth Amendment. See supra notes 157-58
and accompanying text. According to Justice Breyer, the majority opinion essentially eliminates
the knock-and-announce rule as a constitutional protection, but rather than doing so by reexamining Wilson, the majority does so under the auspices of a discussion of suppression. Hudson, 126
S. Ct. at 2182 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("To argue that police efforts to assure compliance with the
rule may prove dangerous, however, is not to argue against evidence suppression. It is to argue
against the validity of the [knock-and-announce] rule itself."); id. at 2182-83 ("[I]f the Court fears
that effective enforcement of a constitutional requirement will have harmful consequences, it
should face those fears directly by addressing the requirement itself. It should not argue, 'the
requirement is fine, indeed, a serious matter, just don't enforce it."').
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announce rule after Hudson at least245
shows that the rule's exact dimensions will
remain unknown for the time being.
VI. HUDSON'S IMPACT ON THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

[T]oday's decision may signal that a majority of my colleagues
have positioned themselves to reopen the door still further and
abandon6 altogether the exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure
cases.

24

It now appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth
Amendment is complete.24 7
The above quotes were not directed at Hudson; they are criticisms of the
1974 decision of United States v. Calandra and the 1984 decision of United
States v. Leon, respectively. These quotes do, however, mirror many of the
criticisms leveled at Hudson.24 8

Contrary to the criticisms of Hudson's detractors, Hudson's application
of the Calandrabalancing test does not mark a drastic change in exclusionary
rule jurisprudence. 249 Hudson does, however, bring the debate to the present.
As courts have relied on Hudson, they have shown discomfort with the proposition that adequate alternative remedies exist to diminish the need for the exclusionary rule. Despite this discomfort, courts are relying on Hudson to create a
presumption against suppression and to decrease the scope of the exclusionary
rule in reliance on Hudson.
A.

Hudson Brings the Exclusionary Rule Debate to the Present

Hudson's profound effect is not the weighing of costs and benefits,25 °
but the reopening of the debate about the existence of alternative remedies and
the effect that such remedies have on the need for deterrence through suppression. Hudson focuses the debate in the existence of alternative remedies in the
present day.

245

Cf Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2182 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The very process of arguing the

merits of the violation would help to clarify the contours of the knock-and-announce rule, contours that the majority believes arc too fuzzy.").
246 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

248

See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.

249

But see Blair, supra note 14, at 756-57 (asserting that Hudson "abandon[s] the deterrence

rationale that has been applied for over forty years" by the Supreme Court).
250

The Supreme Court has applied the Calandrabalancing test consistently to determine the

scope of the exclusionary rule for over three decades. See supra Part II.C.
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In applying Calandra,Justice Scalia discounts the need for deterrence
based on present day civil remedies and the current state of professionalism and
training in law enforcement. 25 1 In asserting that remedies exist today to decrease the need for deterrence, Justice
Scalia logically places his discussion of
252
alternative remedies in the present.
Justice Breyer asserts that the Court should not balance costs and benefits; instead, the Court should determine only whether the rule's application
would lack any deterrence value. 253 He rejects the weighing of general social
costs, because if the court weighs the general social harm of suppression against
any additional deterrence benefits, the costs will always win, trumping the exclusionary rule.2 4
Justice Breyer's repudiation of the balancing goes against the weight of
Calandra,Leon, and Lopez-Mendoza, among others, where the Court has consistently weighed the injury incurred by the rule's application against the benefits of suppression. 255 The scope of the exclusionary rule "must be resolved by
weighing the costs and benefits."2 6 When weighing the costs, the Supreme
Court has regularly concerned itself with the general social costs of the exclusionary rule.257
Hudson makes clear that when examining the exclusionary rule courts
should not only examine the costs incurred in a specific context,258 but also the
general harm to society and the truth-finding function of the legal system. Such
balancing of interests is not a concept foreign to the Court, 259 but examining the
benefits of a rule without considering its costs seems to stop short of a complete
analysis of the issue. Hudson's focus on balancing social costs does not mark a
251
252

See supra notes 195-214 and accompanying text.
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (2006) ("We cannot assume that exclusion in

[one] context is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence in
different contexts and long ago. That would be forcing the public today to pay for the sins and
inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost half a century ago."). Judge Moylan, in discussing Hudson's present-day reevaluation of adequate alternative remedies, stated, "There ...
follow in the opinion [the] unmistakable subterranean rumblings of possible future import in the
discussion of viable alternatives to the exclusionary rule." State v. Savage, 906 A.2d 1054, 1086
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
253
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2176 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2177 ("The majority's 'substantial social costs' argument is an argument against the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary principle itself.").
255
See supra Part II.C.
256
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984) (emphasis added).
257
Id. at 907 (stating that the costs that the exclusionary rule inflicts "have long been a source
254

of concern"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 (1976) ("[Tlhe substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist with special force.").
258
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to the "special" costs incurred
by application of the exclusionary rule in a given context).
259
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (requiring a balancing of public and private interests to determine the scope of due process protections).
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major shift in the Court's precedent, and on its face it would not appear to have
long-term affects on the exclusionary rule, unless the Court finds alternative
remedies to be adequate.
Justice Breyer denies the effectiveness of the majority's purported alternative remedies, rejects examination of the social costs, and proposes that the
Court not reopen the difficult social questions decided in Mapp.2 ° However,
Justice Stewart stated over two decades ago that the examination of adequate
261
alternative remedies must occur with a focus on the "present, not the past.,
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's discussion of alternative remedies in LopezMendoza explicitly acknowledged that the Court should revisit the adequacy of
those remedies in the future as needed.2 62
This discussion will not resolve the debate of whether the remedies that
exist today are adequate-while civil rights actions have expanded greatly since
Mapp,263 limits on the same actions have expanded as wel1264__but the dissent's
position that the Court should not reexamine the costs and benefits based on
present day conditions fails to recognize that "[t]he world
has changed in the
265
[forty-six] years since the Mapp decision was announced.,
The questions that the Court struggled with in Wolf and Mapp were
questions that judges had been struggling with for decades.26 6 Given the great
minds that have struggled over this question on the bench, not to mention those
scholars who have struggled with it through the countless pages of law review
articles, 267 itiscritical that the Supreme Court continue to examine closely its
exclusionary rule decisions.
260

261
262
263

Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2173-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Stewart, supra note 26, at 1385.
See supra notes 128-29, 136 and accompanying text.
Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2167 (majority opinion) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)

(expanding color of law doctrine)); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978) (providing for municipality liability under Section 1983); and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing implied private cause of action under the Fourth
Amendment against federal officers)).
264
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending state sovereign immunity to suits in
state court); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding federal executive officials entitled to qualified immunity); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding Ex
parte Young suit not permitted where Congress has enacted intricate procedures to define and
limit remedies under federal statute); id. (holding Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity under Commerce Clause); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (extending state
sovereign immunity to federal question jurisdiction).
265
Stewart, supra note 26, at 1386; cf. State v. Savage, 906 A.2d 1054, 1088 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2006) ("There is an implication that the exclusionary rule may be caught in a time warp half
a century old.").
266
People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955) (Traynor, J.) (adopting the exclusionary rule);
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (rejecting the exclusionary rule). These
two seminal, and conflicting, decisions were cited in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
267
Kamisar, supra note 25, at 119 n.1 (containing a short bibliography of some seminal works
on the exclusionary rule from various sides of the debate).
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The Supreme Court's exclusionary rule decisions are not sacrosanct; as
the Court's understanding of the costs and benefits of suppression change, and
as alternative remedies develop or are shown to be inadequate, the exclusionary
rule's scope changes. 268 Hudson recognizes that the exclusionary rule requires
this delicate balance, tempered by changing judicial understanding, and in this
regard Hudson is neither ground-breaking nor does it break with precedent, even
though one may disagree with the result of the balance.2 69
As such, Hudson does not "pose[] a greater threat to the exclusionary
rule than the past decisions that limited its application., 270 Hudson continues to
apply the Calandra balancing test in a logical fashion.27' If the exclusionary
See, e.g., Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Today's decision does not
address any demonstrated pattern of knock-and-announce violations. If a widespread pattern of
violations were shown, and particularly if those violations were committed against persons who
lacked the means or voice to mount an effective protest, there would be reason for grave concern."); id. at 2167 (majority opinion) ("We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts and
long ago.").
Justice Blackmun recognized the "provisional" nature of exclusionary rule decisions, stating, "What must be stressed, however, is that any empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional one. By their very nature,
the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot be cast in stone. To the contrary, they now
will be tested in the real world of state and federal law enforcement, and this Court will attend to
the results. If it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance with the
Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here. The logic of a
decision that rests on untested predictions about police conduct demands no less." United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
269
See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
270
See Fourth Amendment-Exclusionary Rule, supra note 16, at 182-83.
271 There is another aspect of the Supreme Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence that is worth
268

examining to determine if, in light of Hudson, the exclusionary rule is truly in danger, and that is
the concept of "incremental deterrence benefits." Leon, 468 U.S. at 909. Based on the following
logic, the principle of incremental deterrence value militates against the complete removal of the
exclusionary rule any time soon. First, the Supreme Court has held that when weighing the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule in a specific context, the value is measured by the incremental
value of deterrence: based on how much deterrence exists because of the rule's existing application, how much more deterrence is added by its application in the context at hand? For example,
consider Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which held that the exclusionary rule did not apply
to grand jury hearings. Given the existing deterrence value of the exclusionary rule at the time,
how much more deterrence would be added by further exclusion of evidence from grand jury
proceedings? That difference is the incremental deterrence value of the exclusionary rule, and the
Calandra balancing test considers only this incremental deterrence benefit when determining
whether to apply the exclusionary rule in the context at hand. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974). Thus, the Court has relied on incremental deterrence value to hold that the exclusionary rule should not apply in a variety of contexts or proceedings over the last thirty years. However, were the Court to reverse Mapp, the incremental deterrence value of applying the exclusionary rule would increase exponentially in many of the post-Mapp cases. Therefore, somewhat
paradoxically, by reversing Mapp, the Court would in essence be forcing reevaluation of the value
of deterrence in other contexts. Thus, something would have to displace the deterrence value of
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rule is in danger-or in other words, if supporters of the exclusionary rule feel
that it is vulnerable after Hudson-any danger results from the Court's jurisprudence over the last thirty-plus years,272 not because of the 2006 decision of Hudson. Hudson's evaluation of the present-day costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule is a logical and necessary application of three decades of Supreme
Court decisions, and without considering these factors in light of the present
day, commentators and scholars remain in the proverbial dark ages.
B.

Courts Are Uncomfortable With the Adequacy of Alternative Remedies

Although Hudson's major impact is the reopening of the debate about
the necessity of the exclusionary rule in light of adequate alternative remedies,
courts are reluctant to agree that Hudson's purported remedies-civil suits and
the professionalism of police forces-are adequate.
Courts have often referred to Hudson's application of the Calandrabalancing test, and they have cited Hudson with particular fervor regarding the
social costs of suppression.27 3 Courts have even relied on Hudson's discussion
of social costs to narrow the exclusionary rule, or suggest its further narrowing. 274 However, neither the Calandra balancing test nor the examination of
social costs are major shifts in the Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence.27 5
On the other hand, courts have not delved into Hudson's proposition that alternative remedies have decreased the need for the exclusionary rule, and in the
one federal case referring to this proposition, the court rejected the effectiveness
of these remedies. 76 This disparity in treatment suggests that while courts are
comfortable discussing and considering the social costs of suppression, they
may disagree with the effectiveness of Hudson's purported remedies.277
United States v. Mosley is the only federal case to examine Hudson's
proposed alternative remedies, and Mosley essentially rejects the proposition
that civil suits and police professionalism decrease the need for the exclusionary
rule.278 Mosley may be the first judicial response in the reopened debate over
the necessity of the exclusionary rule in light of alternative remedies.

the exclusionary rule, most likely adequate alternative remedies through civil actions, before the
Court could overrule Mapp.
272
Cf Ashdown, supra note 7, at 755.
273
See infra Parts VI.C and VI.D.
274
275
276
277

See infra Part VI.D.
See supra Part VI.A.
See infra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
See also Blair, supra note 14, at 758-60 (challenging the increased professionalism of police

forces as an adequate alternative remedy).
278
454 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2006). But see State v. Hastings, 959 So. 2d 1000 (La. Ct. App.
2007) (refusing to suppress evidence seized in violation of state law in part because adequate
alternative remedies exist).
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Robert Mosley was a passenger in Julian Hayes's vehicle when the police stopped the car on the basis of an anonymous tip.279 Officers found weapons in the car and arrested both Mosley and Hayes for gun possession. 280 Because the officers did not observe Hayes violate any traffic laws and because
they based the stop solely on an anonymous tip, the government conceded that
the stop, and therefore the seizure, was unlawful. 28' The government dropped
the charges against the driver, Hayes, but argued that Mosley had no standing to
suppress the guns as a passenger in the vehicle.282 The District Court agreed and
denied the motion to suppress, and Mosley was convicted.28 3
Mosley's appeal presented the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
with a matter of first impression: can a passenger without possessory interest in
a vehicle suppress evidence seized pursuant to an unlawful stop of the vehicle? 284 Judge Fisher examined whether the evidence was the fruit of the unlawful seizure; specifically he examined whether, just as a short-term guest cannot
contest the unlawful search of a home, a passenger cannot move to suppress
evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful seizure of a vehicle.285 He held, after a
thorough analysis, that the evidence was the fruit of the unlawful seizure, but
before determining that suppression was appropriate, he noted that under Hudson a court should consider the balancing of costs and benefits:
The test by which our models of constitutional causation are
measured is not empirical validation by experiment, but rather
the march of social progress, refracted through continual judicial evaluation of constitutional purposes and social consequences.286
In applying this balancing test, Judge Fisher stated that the court must consider:
the nature of the personal and social interests the Constitution
protects, the prevalence of the illegal police practice at issue,

251.

279

Mosley, 454 F.3d at

280

Id.

281

Id. ("[A]nonymous tips do not provide sufficient justification for an investigatory stop.").

282

Id. at 251-52.

283

Id. at 252.

284

ld. at 251.

285

See id. at 252-60.

Id. at 267; see also supra notes 52-55 and 114-15 and accompanying text; Denniston, supra
note 4 ("[Tlhe Court made clear that its views may be changing on the value of the exclusionary
rule in deterring police misconduct.").
286
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the deterrent value of the suppression remedy, and the likely
practical effects of a particular rule.287
Asserting that suppression would serve the Fourth Amendment's purpose, Judge
Fisher then returned fire to the newly reopened debate over the necessity of the
exclusionary rule in light of alternative remedies:
While the Supreme Court may be right about the increased professionalism of police and the robustness of the § 1983 plaintiffs' bar, we cannot say that either racial profiling or reliance
on anonymous tips has declined in frequency in recent years, or
that civil lawsuits will adequately deter such practices. Nor can
we say that the various other categories of cases that give rise to
passenger suppression motions are rare, decreasing, sufficiently
2 88
internallydisciplined,or otherwise deterred.
Because Judge Fisher found the alternative remedies to suppression to be inadequate, and thus found the need for deterrence to be great, he held that suppression was appropriate. 289
Judge Fisher's opinion in Mosley is remarkable for several reasons.
First, he explicitly recognizes that the scope of the exclusionary rule will change
over time.29° Second, although he refers to the balancing test from Hudson,29 1
he focuses on the need for deterrence without almost any discussion of the social costs of the exclusionary rule.292 While Mosley states that it is applying

287

Id. at 268 (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166-71 (2006)). Judge Fisher

performed this balancing in the context of his causation analysis. See id. at 267 ("The Supreme
Court has just this Term reiterated that the exclusionary rule was founded on, and is grounded in,
the continuing exercise of pragmatic judicial supervision of the law enforcement activities of the
executive branch, effectuated by expansion and contraction of the bubble of proximate cause as
courts face particular concrete factual situations." (citing Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2159)). Other
courts have inserted Hudson's costs-benefits analysis into the analysis of causation. See infra
notes 327-28 and accompanying text. If courts continue to consider the costs of suppression when
examining causal attenuation, likely fewer motions to suppress will be granted.
288 Mosley, 454 F.3d at 268 (emphasis added).
289
Id. at 268-69.
290
Id. at 267-68 ("As the social context of law enforcement evolves, so too does the exclusionary rule."). Interestingly, at the conclusion of his discussion of Hudson, Judge Fisher stated, "Justice Scalia's opinion epitomizes such pragmatic balancing, 'interpreting the Constitution in light
of its own practical concern for an active liberty that is itself a practical process."' Id. at 269
(quoting STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LtBERTY 74 (2005)). Given that Judge Fisher appeared to
balance only the benefits, and not the costs, of suppression, the balancing to which Judge Fisher
refers may not be that which Justice Scalia intended.
291
See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
292
See supra text accompanying note 288.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/10

40

Rayburn: What is "Blowing in the Wind"? Reopening the Exclusionary Rule De

2008]

REOPENING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DEBATE

Hudson, it is essentially applying Justice Breyer's preferred test for suppression:
93
evidence should be suppressed if it will result in appreciable deterrence.
Finally, and most significantly, Judge Fisher rejects the existence of alternative remedies. 294 Although arguably he rejects only that alternative remedies exist in the context of unlawful traffic stops, his reasoning is not limited to
this narrow context. By stating that the Supreme Court "may be right,"2 95 he
implies that the Supreme Court might be wrong in its conclusions about the
adequacy of remedies.
Just as Justice Scalia's opinion reopens the debate over the necessity of
the rule in light of the existence of alternative remedies, 296 Judge Fisher's opinion in Mosley enters the debate, respectfully. Considering Judge Fisher's opinion together with the fact that judges have relied on Hudson's social costs analysis to limit the exclusionary rule,297 but have not relied on the suggestion that
298
alternative remedies exist to do the same, suggests that the judiciary is more
comfortable with Justice Scalia's social costs analysis and less so with his alternative remedies analysis. It may also suggest that courts will not accept Hudson's alternative remedies, at least without an expansion of those remedies by
the Supreme Court.
C.

Hudson Createsa PresumptionAgainst Suppression

Although courts are uncomfortable with Hudson's alternative remedies,299 they have relied on Hudson rather extensively for the proposition that
suppression should be the "last resort.,,300 These cases appear to derive from
Hudson a presumption against suppression.3 °1
293

294

295
296
297
298
299

See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 288.
Mosley, 454 F.3d at 268.
See supra Part VI.A.
See infra Part VI.D.
Mosley appears to be the only opinion referring to this portion of Justice Scalia's opinion.
See supra Part VI.B.

300

See, e.g., United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1217 (1lth Cir. 2007) (holding that suppression was not appropriate based on good faith exception); United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d
1041, 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding, in part, that suppression of evidence seized in alleged
violation of federal pen-register statute was not appropriate); United States v. Grey, 491 F.3d 138,
156-57 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that witness's testimony was admissible because it was voluntary); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that exclusionary rule not
appropriate for statutory violation of immigration laws); United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148,
1154-55 (10th Cir. 2006) (reaffirming severance doctrine); United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that suppression of evidence of child pornography was not appropriate
even though "wholesale seizure" that occurred was unlawful); United States v. Atwell, 470 F.
Supp. 2d 554, 578-79 n.39 (D. Md. 2007) (stating that unconstitutional extra-jurisdictional arrest
might not require suppression because suppression is a "last resort" under Hudson, and the costs
under the Calandra balancing test do not outweigh the benefits); United States v. Reyes-Bosque,
463 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that even if search was pursuant to an un-
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Professor Chemerinsky states that Justice Scalia places "the presumption against the application of the exclusionary rule" and that prior to Hudson
the Court had not placed the presumption against suppression. °2 Neither Justice
Scalia nor Professor Chemerinsky cites support for their competing propositions
on the presumption for or against suppression.30 3 In reality, however, Hudson
does appear to create a presumption against suppression. Of a survey of cases
citing the "last resort" language, 30 4 all but one denied the defendant's motion to
would have an alsuppress, in whole or in part, or stated in dicta that the court
30 5
ternate ground to deny the motion in reliance on Hudson.
D.

Courts Have Extended Hudson Beyond Knock-and-Announce

Although courts may be uncomfortable with the existence or adequacy
of Hudson's alternative remedies, courts nonetheless rely on Hudson to limit the
exclusionary rule outside of the knock-and-announce context. Courts have cited
Hudson's application of the Calandrabalancing test to suggest limitation of the
exclusionary rule in dicta3°6 and to hold against suppression beyond the knockconstitutional, warrantless entry, suppression may not be appropriate where the law enforcement
officer was attempting to corroborate defendant's story); United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-0167
WHA, 2006 WL 3193770, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006) (holding that second arrest was sufficiently attenuated from initial unlawful search that suppression was not appropriate as to items
seized pursuant to subsequent arrest); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 778, 788, 794
(N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that search fell "within the foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth
Amendment's general warrant requirement"). The "last resort" language comes from Justice
Scalia's majority opinion. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006) ("Suppression
of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.").
301 See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
302
See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 20.
303
See id.; Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. Although the Author does not examine the competing
theories on the presumption for or against suppression, the Supreme Court has used language that
might imply a presumption against suppression in United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974) ("As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.").
304
See cases cited supra note 300.
305 The cases denying the motion to suppress in all respects include Herring, 492 F.3d at 1217;
Forrester,495 F.3d at 1050; Grey, 491 F.3d at 157; Abdi, 463 F.3d at 556; Reyes-Bosque, 463 F.
Supp. 2d at 1145-46; Diaz, 2006 WL 3193770, at *3; Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 788, 794. Two
cases suppressed the evidence only in part, severing the valid portion of the search and seizure
from the unlawful portion. See Sells, 463 F.3d at 1154-55; Hill, 459 F.3d at 977. In Atwell, 470
F. Supp. 2d at 578-79 n.39, the court held that no constitutional violation had occurred but
strongly suggested that suppression nonetheless would not have been appropriate, partly in reliance on Hudson's presumption against suppression. Of the cases surveyed, only in United States
v. Klebig, No. 06-CR-64, 2006 WL 2038366, at *1 (E.D. Wis. July 20, 2006) did a court grant the
motion to suppress while relying on Hudson'spresumption against suppression. Id. at *11-12.
306
See United States v. Elder, 466 F.3d 1090, 1091 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing to Hudson's discussion of social costs of exclusionary rule for the proposition that the rule be limited to searches
conducted without probable cause, regardless of the warrant requirement); United States v. Harju,
466 F.3d 602, 605-06 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing Hudson's balancing test in dicta before
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and-announce context. 30 7 Cases relying on Hudson to limit the exclusionary
rule, however, do so through particular reliance on the social costs of suppression, without examining the existence of alternative remedies.
Judge Easterbrook's short opinion in United States v. Elder may be portentous regarding the impact of Hudson on the exclusionary rule beyond knockand-announce. 308 The defendant appealed the denial of a motion seeking to
suppress evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing seized during a warrantless search of an outbuilding pursuant to a 911 call. 30 9 The panel disposed
of the appeal in a single paragraph of reasoning, determining that the officers
acted reasonably in light of "considerations of safety" that created exigent circumstances making a warrant unnecessary.31 0
What is striking, however, is what Judge Easterbrook suggests in dicta
about the exclusionary rule and the inevitable discovery doctrine. The inevitable discovery doctrine adlai±s evidence that "would ultimately or inevitably
have been discovered even if no violation of any constitutional or statutory provision had taken place, 311 because the deterrence benefit would not outweigh
the social costs of suppression. 312 In the case of a warrantless search pursuant to
probable cause, courts generally require the prosecution to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the steps to obtain the warrant have been taken before the search is executed.313 Where officers have probable cause and can obtain a warrant, but they choose not to, courts generally will not apply the inevitable discovery doctrine because doing so would undermine the historical preference for warrants.314
proceeding to find that the good-faith exception applied to the facts of the case); United States v.
Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 2006) (referring to Hudson's balancing of social costs against
deterrence benefits to support the proposition that "there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations").
307
See cases cited infra note 321.
308
466 F.3d at 1091.
309 id. at 1090.
310
Id. at 1091.
311
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 434 (1984).
312
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 544-51 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
313
Elder, 466 F.3d at 1091 ("The usual understanding of that doctrine is that the exclusionary
rule should not be applied when all the steps required to obtain a valid warrant have been taken
before the premature search occurs."); Robert M. Bloom, Inevitable Discovery: An Exception
Beyond the Fruits,20 AM. J. C iM. L. 79, 85 (1992) (asserting that in Nix v. Williams the majority
"require[ed] that the alternative investigation must have at least been started for the exception to
apply.").
314
See United States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 841 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[Wlhen evidence could not
have been discovered without a subsequent search, and no exception to the warrant requirement
applies, and no warrant has been obtained, and nothing demonstrates that the police would have
obtained a warrant absent the illegal search, the inevitable discovery doctrine has no place.");
United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196. 1206 (5th Cir. 1985) (declining to apply the inevitable
discovery doctrine "because at the time of the warrantless search the agents could have obtained a
warrant but had made no effort to do so"); United States v. Torres, 274 F. Supp. 2d 146, 161
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Judge Easterbrook suggested that it "would be a good development" to
extend the inevitable discovery doctrine to all searches where probable cause
exists.31 5 The effect would be to limit the exclusionary rule's reach to "searches
[executed] without probable cause," whether or not the search was otherwise
unlawful.3 16 In extending this broad invitation, Judge Easterbrook referred to
the Fourth Amendment and to Hudson's weighing of the high social costs of
suppression.3 17
Judge Easterbrook's suggestion would reject the historical preference
for warrants.3' 8 He does conclude the opinion noting that the United States Supreme Court would have to make such a broad change in precedent. 3 9 Despite
this limiting language, Judge Easterbrook's suggestions in Elder suggest that
courts are willing to apply Hudson-balancing of costs and benefits, with particular emphasis on Justice Scalia's strong language about social costs-to limit
the exclusionary rule in contexts beyond knock-and-announce.3 2 °
Although Judge Easterbrook spoke expansively, his statements were
made expressly in dicta. Other courts have actually balanced the costs and
benefits of exclusion, with particular focus on the costs, to extend Hudson beyond its knock-and-announce roots. In three federal appellate decisions, panels
have found suppression inappropriate when balancing the costs and benefits,32 '
(D.R.I. 2003) ("In addition to probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires the intervention of
a neutral and detached magistrate. Here, the record is completely devoid of any evidence indicating that the DEA even considered obtaining a warrant.").
315

Elder,466 F.3d at 1091.

316

Id.

317

Id. Judge Easterbrook stated, "The exclusionary rule comes at such high cost to the admini-

stration of the criminal justice system that its application might sensibly be confined to violations
of the reasonableness requirement." Id. This statement in and of itself is not remarkable. See,
e.g., Amar, First Principles,supra note 27, at 801-11 (proposing that all searches should be examined for reasonableness only); cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (applying a test of reasonableness to determine whether a stop-and-frisk encounter violated the Fourth Amendment).
What is remarkable is his reliance on Hudson in suggesting that courts do away with the preference for warrants. See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
318
See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
319 Elder, 466 F.3d at 1091 ("But whether to trim the exclusionary rule in this fashion is a decision for the Supreme Court rather than a court of appeals.").
320
See supra note 306.
321
Mosby v. Senkowski, 470 F.3d 515, 522-33 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying Hudson's balancing
test and concluding that "the social costs of suppressing [the defendant's] voluntary confession to
two homicides would have been considerable," and as such, holding that "custodial confession
was too attenuated from his warrantless arrest to require suppression"); United States v. Hill, 459
F.3d 966, 977 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Hudson's balancing test and holding that suppression of
evidence of child pornography was not appropriate even though "wholesale seizure" that occurred
was unlawful; United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Hudson's
balancing test in re-affirming the severance doctrine-"whereby valid portions of a warrant are
severed from the invalid portions and only materials seized under the authority of the valid portions, or lawfully seized while executing the valid portions, are admissible"); see also United
States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1123-24 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (Baldock, J., dissent-
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and in at least one federal District Court case, the court concluded that suppression was appropriate despite the costs. 322 These cases show that courts applying
Hudson outside of knock-and-announce appear to balance the costs and benefits,
with a focus on the general social costs, but the same courts are not relying on
Justice Scalia's discussion of decreased need for the exclusionary rule.
For example, Mosby v. Senkowski relied on Hudson's application of the
balancing test to conclude that Mosby's custodial interrogation after an unlawful
arrest was lawfully admitted.32 3 Officers had unlawfully arrested324 Mosby for
selling cocaine, and they were holding him in a squad car when a passerby's
comment connected Mosby to an unrelated crime, an unsolved double homicide.325 As a result, four witnesses to the homicides identified Mosby, after
which he confessed.326
In determining whether the confession should be suppressed, the court
examined how attenuated the confession was to the unlawful arrest.327 As part
of the analysis of the attenuation between Mosby's unlawful arrest and his subsequent identification and confession,328 the court applied Hudson's costbenefits balancing test, with an emphasis on the social costs:
Suppressing Mosby's confession would be unlikely to deter future police misconduct, since the police-at the time they entered 46 Costar to make a routine drug arrest-could not have
anticipated the fortuitous chain of events that ultimately connected Mosby to the homicides.... In addition, the social costs
ing) (discussing Hudson's balancing test and concluding that suppression of fingerprints and alien
file obtained through unlawful arrest should not be suppressed because the social costs outweigh
the deterrence benefits).
322
United States v. Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md. 2006) (holding suppression appropriate despite the social costs); see also United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 267-69 (3d Cir.
2006) (applying Hudson's balancing test and determining that evidence seized pursuant to an
illegal traffic stop should be suppressed as to all passengers) (discussed infra Part VI.B).
323 470 F.3d at 523. Mosby entailed an appeal of a denial of writ of habeas corpus based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 517. As such, Mosby needed to show that counsel's failure to seek suppression of his confession was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 519 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). Therefore, the case has questionable
precedential value. However, given the panel's analysis of the balancing of social costs against
deterrence benefits, and the strong language used in its analysis, id. at 523, this case is useful in
discussing Hudson's effect on the future of the exclusionary rule.
324
The arrest was unlawful because, without a warrant and without consent, the officers entered the home where Mosby was residing to affect the arrest. Id. at 519-20.
325
Id. at 517-18.
326
Id.
327
Id. at 522-23.
328 Id. ("[T]o evaluate attenuation in the context of a custodial confession following a warrantless home arrest, we [examine the following factors:] administration of Miranda warnings,
temporal proximity of the arrest and statement, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct ....
(citations omitted)).
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of suppressing Mosby's voluntary confession to two homicides
would have been considerable.2 9
The court weighed the social costs, finding them "considerable," such that the
deterrence value did not outweigh them. 330 The court's willingness to apply
Hudson's balancing of costs and benefits outside of knock-and-announce, even
outside of an unlawful search, shows that the effect of Hudson may be farreaching.
Mosby v. Senkowski contrasts with the decision of the District Court for
the District of Maryland in United States v. Srivastava.33 1 In Srivastava, the
court held that evidence seized during execution of a search warrant fell outside
the scope of the warrant's description of items to be seized.332 In determining
whether any exceptions to the exclusionary rule applied, the court began by cit333
ing Hudson's balancing of the social costs against the deterrence benefits.
The court reviewed existing exceptions to the exclusionary rule and concluded
that none applied. 334 In so concluding, the court recognized the "mighty toll"
that the suppression had exacted on the case, but stated, "this is the rare and
unfortunate case where such a price must be paid., 335 In finding the costs warranted, the court did not examine the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary
rule, but rather cited Mapp336v. Ohio for the proposition that judicial integrity
outweighed the social costs.
Srivastava'sdeference to judicial integrity, in light of the weighty costs
of suppression, raises a potential side-effect of Hudson's broad language: courts
may look for other factors to place on the benefits side of balance in order to
offset the weighty cost of suppression. Justice Scalia stressed the costs of exclusion, while downplaying the need for deterrence in light of alternative remedies.337 The broad conclusions that he reached on the costs and benefits rightfully raise the question of how a court could ever find the deterrence costs to
329

ld at 523 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

330

Id.

331 444 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md. 2006). The case of United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249 (3d
Cir. 2006), discussed supra Part VI.B, also held that suppression was appropriate, despite reliance
on Hudson.

332

Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 396.

333 Id. at 401.

334 Id. at 401-12 (holding as inapplicable inevitable discovery doctrine and independent source
doctrine).

335

Id. at 412.

336

Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961)).

But see People v. Galland, 52 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 799, 808 (Cal. App. 2006) (holding, on due process grounds, that deterrence benefits
outweighed social costs, thus warranting suppression of evidence where judge allowed affiant to
retain original search warrant affidavit), review granted and opinion superseded by 156 P.3d 1015
(Cal. 2007).
337 Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163-67 (2006).
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outweigh the benefits.338 In Srivastava, the District Court overcame the costs by
resurrecting the imperative of judicial integrity, which the Supreme Court all but
rejected as a rationale for the exclusionary rule thirty years ago. 339 Thus, as a
result of Hudson, courts may add to the benefits side of the balance not only the
value of deterrence, but also the imperative of judicial integrity and other nondeterrence rationales that the Supreme Court has largely disregarded.34 °
Mosby v. Senkowski and United States v. Srivastava show that courts are
relying on Hudson's balancing of costs and benefits, but at the same time they
demonstrate that courts have considerable discretion in determining what goes
onto different sides of the scale. While it appears that courts are willing to
weigh the grave social costs of the exclusionary rule, the reference to judicial
integrity in Srivastava shows that courts are left with great discretion in their
analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia's opinion in Hudson has invigorated the debate over the
future of the exclusionary rule. Its application of the Calandrabalancing test
and its consideration of the general social costs were not novel. Examining the
exclusionary rule cases of Calandra,Leon, and Lopez-Mendoza, precedent supports Hudson's application of the balancing of deterrence benefits against social
costs. However, Hudson's discussion of alternative remedies has reopened the
debate over the necessity of the exclusionary rule; the focus on reevaluation of
the deterrence benefits, in light of alternative remedies and the changing face of
law enforcement in the years since Mapp, is logical and comports with common-sense. The exclusionary rule may not survive this debate.
The examination of the cases relying on Hudson shows that there are a
variety of issues remaining before this debate is resolved. Primary among these
is how law enforcement will react to the diminishing scope of the rule. Their
reaction to Mapp suggests that law enforcement may have less incentive to respect Fourth Amendment rights-at least the knock-and-announce rule-postHudson,341 unless and until alternative remedies become a concern to law enforcement.
In the wake of Hudson, what is left to be determined is how the constitutional guarantee of the knock-and-announce rule will be defined without suppression hearings to litigate the details. Will civil actions be adequate to provide deterrence against violations of this right? Will the United States Supreme
338

Cf. supra notes 216-25 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer's rejection of the

Calandrabalancing test as applied in Hudson's majority opinion).
339
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976).
See supra note 61 (discussing various non-deterrence rationales for the exclusionary rule).
See Kamisar, supra note 25, at 123-26 (discussing law enforcement reactions to Mapp and
suggesting that their reactions show that alternative remedies are not effective); Fields, supra note
243 (relating positive reactions of police officers to a post-Hudson knock-and-announce ruling).
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Court or the various United States Courts of Appeals further extend Hudson to
limit areas where the exclusionary rule has been applied for the last half a century?
Some of these questions will be answered by the test of time, but future
research is warranted in several areas. Empirical evidence about the effectiveness of civil suits in the knock-and-announce context would help to understand
whether the Hudson majority's reasoning is warranted. Furthermore, to understand if the professionalism of police forces will protect against violations of the
knock-and-announce rule, research into law enforcement policies, official and
unofficial, in the wake of Hudson would help to understand whether the law
enforcement professionals of the twenty-first century have taken Hudson as an
invitation to disregard knock-and-announce requirements, or whether they have
continued to operate under the same professional standards predating June
2006.342 Evidence of changes, or lack thereof, in these procedures would also
either buttress or undermine Justice Scalia's reasoning in Hudson regarding the
necessity of the exclusionary rule to deter unlawful police behavior.
Note that neither of these suggestions, even if they came out to show
that the Hudson majority's "judicial understanding" was incorrect, would militate toward a holding that the exclusionary rule applies to knock-and-announce
violations: 34 3 there is still the issue of causation, which most commentators
have not attacked in any fashion even nearing their attack of Hudson's discussion of the balancing test. What the suggested research will provide, however,
is an empirical foundation upon which the United States Supreme Court can
appropriately build their present-day "judicial understanding" regarding the
exclusionary rule. With better, up-to-date information, the Court can base future decisions that build on Hudson to understand what the need is today for the
exclusionary rule as a deterrent against unlawful police conduct. If anything is
"blowing in the wind," 344 it is that the Court is prepared to reevaluate the assumptions underlying the decision in Mapp, and justices are prepared to debate
alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule. The key question is what information will be available for the United States Supreme Court when the time arrives.

John B. Rayburn*
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Professor Blair, who takes issue with the increased professionalism of police forces as a

rationale in Hudson, does not appear to go to the level of research that might be required to understand whether this rationale is truly effective. See Blair, supra note 14, at 759-60.
343 See supra Part V.A.
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